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Abstract
Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory of the “sinthome” and Friedrich Nietzsche’s tragic
philosophy of self-overcoming are deeply complementary theories of linguistic
subjectivity, each describing the transformative potential of a kind of art at the centre of
the inherently symptomatic experience of language. Lacan’s final seminars reimagine the
psychoanalytic symptom as the potential site where each subject might forge a sinthome:
a singular structure of creative agency in the experience of desire and truth. Nietzsche’s
tragic philosophy works to uncover the problematically aesthetic and creative character
of reality, suggesting that one must affirm and cultivate such creativity in order to
overcome the tragic character of existence. Examined together, these two theories
illuminate each other, as each argues that language is symptomatically plagued by a
religious logic of truth which can be overcome only by a radical affirmation of creativity
in one’s experience of truth and desire.
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Summary for Lay Audience
The philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche and the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan each suggest
that human existence is problematically creative at its very core. By considering their
thought together, one comes to see that each of them takes the lived experience of
language to be plagued by a hidden religious logic. This logic, they argue, is primarily
one of identity and permanence; people typically take themselves, the external objects of
perception, and the concepts with which they understand such perception to be
dependably self-identical. In other words, everyday experience tends towards a
straightforwardly objective experience of language and reality. For Lacan and Nietzsche,
however, such faith in objectivity is a daydream that masks the status of reality as an
artistic process in which one always participates, and for which humanity ultimately
bears creative responsibility. Moreover, they each believe that our misunderstanding of
truth as an independent order of permanence and objectivity leads to a neurotic paralysis
of creativity and agency. Lacan’s idea of the “sinthome” and Nietzsche’s tragic
philosophy of “self-overcoming” are deeply complementary theories of how this
paralyzing misunderstanding can be cured through the cultivation of a kind of artistic
agency in the spheres of truth and desire.
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It was her voice that made
The sky acutest at its vanishing.
She measured to the hour its solitude.
She was the single artificer of the world
In which she sang. And when she sang, the sea,
Whatever self it had, became the self
That was her song, for she was the maker. Then we
As we beheld her striding there alone,
Knew that there never was a world for her
Except the one she sang and, singing, made.

Wallace Stevens, “The Idea of Order at Key West.”
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Chapter One: The Death and Undeath of God in Nietzsche and Lacan
1.1 Introduction: The question of the death of God
Though Friedrich Nietzsche is widely considered to have anticipated some key insights of
psychoanalytic theory, and though a good deal of literature has acknowledged and
explored his influence on major analysts such as Freud and Jung, connections between
Nietzsche and another of the monumental figures in the history of psychoanalysis,
Jacques Lacan, have been traced with surprising infrequency. This thesis analyzes the
aspects of Nietzsche’s and Lacan’s teachings that concern the possibility of creativity and
freedom in the lived experience of language and desire. The purpose of this analysis is to
address the remarkable, but as yet unexplored, connections that can be drawn between
Nietzsche’s tragic philosophy of self-overcoming and Lacan’s theorization of the
“sinthome” as complementary antidotes to the fundamentally symptomatic character of
language.
As recently as 2006, Silvia Ons observed that “although there are some studies on
the link between Freud and Nietzsche, there are no studies so far on Nietzsche and
Lacan.”1 In the intervening years the situation has somewhat improved. Currently, there
are four published works that stage a significant encounter between Nietzsche and Lacan.
These texts take a variety of approaches, ranging from criticism to philosophy and even
to advice for the practice of clinical psychoanalysis. Alenka Zupančič pursues the
exegesis of a key component of Nietzsche’s thought, the transformation of subjectivity

Silvia Ons, “Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan,” in Lacan: The Silent Partners, ed. Slavoj Žižek (New York:
Verso, 2006), 80. At the time of Ons’s writing, there already existed one noteworthy exception: Alenka
Zupančič, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT
Press, 2003).
1
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embodied by Nietzsche’s metaphor of the high noon, through the conceptual lens of
Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. As such, Zupančič does not argue for the validity of
connecting Nietzsche and Lacan so much as she simply demonstrates the validity of this
connection by putting it to work. Similarly, but from a decidedly critical vantage point,
Joanne Faulkner utilizes Lacanian psychoanalysis to construct a brilliant and challenging
critique of Nietzsche around the thesis that Nietzsche “[e]nacts [nefariously] what
psychoanalytic theory attempts merely to explain: the subject’s assumption of its social
function.”2 While these two texts consist mostly in applying a psychoanalytic framework
to Nietzsche, Tim Themi takes a more neutral approach by arguing that certain aspects of
Nietzschean and Lacanian thought can be read as deeply complementary and mutually
reinforcing; specifically, Lacan’s ethics of psychoanalysis (that is, the possibility of an
ethical refusal to give up on one’s unique desire) and Nietzsche’s critique of the tradition
of Western metaphysics.3 Finally, Jared Russel, philosopher and practicing
psychoanalyst, argues that Nietzsche’s teachings can be applied with great benefit to the
clinical practice of psychoanalysis, dedicating a full chapter to the incorporation of
Nietzschean insights into Lacanian analytic technique.4
What all of these works express in common is an understanding that Nietzsche
and Lacan share a certain set of diagnostic premises regarding the possibilities (and
impossibilities) of desire and creativity insofar as such possibilities are determined by the
acquisition and inhabitation of language in lived experience. The nature and stakes of

2

Joanne Faulkner, Dead Letters to Nietzsche: or the Necromantic Art of Reading Philosophy (Athens: Ohio
University Press, 2010).
3
Tim Themi, Lacan’s Ethics and Nietzsche’s Critique of Platonism (New York: SUNY Press, 2014).
4
Jared Russel, Nietzsche and the Clinic: Psychoanalysis, Philosophy, Metaphysics (London: Karnac
Books, 2017).
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these mutual concerns of Nietzsche and Lacan are most poignantly articulable, at least in
a preliminary way, in the relation of these thinkers to the crisis of values, desire, and
sublimation embodied in the concept of the “death of God.”
Nietzsche’s famous proclamation that “God is dead,” likely his most popular idea,
finds its earliest articulation in poetic terms: “Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the
entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? … Are
we not continually falling… in all directions? Is there still an up and a down? Aren’t we
straying as through an infinite nothing?”5 These images suggest a new historical epoch in
which the traditional reference points of value and beacons of truth are no longer capable
of fixing a horizon of meaning and purpose, such that we are now lost in a total emptiness
without direction. Nietzsche’s name for this epoch is the era of nihilism.
The contemporary era of nihilism, for Nietzsche, is not only a period of intense
difficulty and risk, but in fact presents humanity with its greatest challenge so far: “Is the
magnitude of this deed [of murdering God] not too great for us? Do we not ourselves
have to become gods merely to appear worthy of it?”6 Essentially, Nietzsche treats the
crisis of nihilism as a crisis of values that demands humanity relearn its forgotten
capacity to create values. Hitherto, humanity experienced meaning, value, and purpose
as guaranteed, directly or indirectly, by faith in a divine order and consistency of reality.
Nietzsche believes that this interpretive organization of human horizons has ultimately
malfunctioned and must be creatively overcome, but also that its breakdown threatens the
very capacity to create anything that might replace it.

5
6

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 120.
Ibid., emphasis added.
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Lacan is hesitant to embrace a certain popular view of the death of God as a
liberating event, but his reasons for this prove to be concerns that Nietzsche shares. In
the eleventh of Lacan’s twenty-seven yearly public seminars on psychoanalysis, which
were addressed to the community of practicing psychoanalysts in Paris but attracted
increasingly popular audiences as the years progressed, Lacan suggests that “the myth of
the God is dead… perhaps this myth is simply a shelter against the threat of castration.”7
I offer a clearer definition of castration below, but for the moment I will suggest that
Lacan dismisses the idea that God is dead when it is used to assert a sudden liberation of
humanity in the spheres of desire, morality, or subjectivity. Moreover, he believes that
people deny the persistent religious logic of language and culture to hide from the real
problem: even if God is dead, even if he never existed, the idea of God still functions to
arrest and torture the subjectivity and desire of even the most ardent atheist in ways that
remain largely unconscious.8
Nietzsche and Lacan are in perfect agreement on this caveat to the idea of the
death of God. As Zupančič suggests, Nietzsche’s thesis is actually twofold: “God is
dead” and “Christianity survived the death of God.”9 The latter thesis means precisely
that the cultural logic, morality, psychology, and metaphysics associated with Christian
faith in God survive, even though the idea of God has become less consciously or
rationally tenable. In the aphorism quoted above, Nietzsche suggests that, for most
people, “This deed is still more remote to them than the remotest stars – and yet they have

7

Jacques Lacan, Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 1998), 27.
8
Ibid., 59.
9
Zupančič, 35.

4

done it themselves!”10 As I will discuss further below, this “remoteness” suggests that
the crisis of values Nietzsche observes, though he takes its contemporary effects to be
ubiquitous, has yet to be widely recognized as a problem. Traditional values, secularized
and religious alike, have malfunctioned such that the benefit of their stability no longer
outweighs the cost of their hegemony. Rather than guaranteeing a sense of meaning and
purpose, the traditional values of the West have come to guarantee a kind of neurosis.
Nietzsche and Lacan agree that the mechanism by which God has survived his own death
in this sense is more subtle than simple cultural inheritance; they take the idea of God to
be encoded into the very interstices of speech and language such that He is tacitly
assumed, preserved, and recreated in the most everyday operations of language as the
force that binds subjectivity to torturous demands. In Lacan’s terms, “as long as things
are said, the God hypothesis will persist,”11 while Nietzsche says, “I am afraid we are not
rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.”12 To see how these two thinkers
converge in their responses to the problem of God one must first understand how each of
them takes the preservation of an undead God in language to be possible.

1.2 The desires and demands of the Other in the Lacanian subject
One of the best in-roads to Lacan’s views as a whole, and central to his understanding of
God’s persistence in language, is his theory of the individual’s relationship with the
unconscious as “Other,” often described in psychoanalytic literature as the “big Other”

10
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for two reasons. First, the “big” or capitalized O distinguishes the Other from the
lowercase “other,” the latter most often denoting another person in the ordinary sense.
Second, and more importantly, “the Other” describes a complex of psychical forces at
work in language that is similar in power and function to Freud’s superego; it is the
internalized locus of all moral authority, prohibitions, and demands concerning identity
and desire. The prominent translator and Lacanian analyst Bruce Fink suggests that “the
Other is that foreign language we must learn to speak which is euphemistically referred to
as our ‘native tongue,’ but which would be much better termed our ‘mOther tongue’: it is
the discourse and desires of others around us insofar as the former are internalized.”13
Another way of phrasing the above is that Lacan’s theory of the Other is an interpretation
of language as inherently symptomatic; the language(s) one speaks are encoded with
values and ideals that bear on one’s relationships, goals, and sense of identity such that
one is full, or typically overfull, with unconscious suggestions, rules, or demands
concerning desire, action, and self-development.
It bears remarking here that the unconscious overflow of these demands is the
broadest definition of the Lacanian symptom and, furthermore, that such neurosis is taken
by Lacan to be the de facto psychology of linguistic human beings. Lacan writes, “‘The
unconscious is not the fact that being thinks’ – though that is implied by what is said
thereof in traditional science – ‘the unconscious is the fact that being, by speaking,
enjoys, and,’ I will add, ‘wants to know nothing more about it.’ I will add that that means
‘know nothing about it at all.’”14 In this context, “being” should be taken to mean the

13

Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1995), 11.
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structural substrate of the possibilities of the human situation, the psychical structures of
the world of language and meaning. Accordingly, Lacan’s belief is that it is not the
subject or the ego that is really at the helm of the ship of language, but rather those very
structures which make egoic subjectivity possible. The thinking “I” is an effect of
language, not its master. Most importantly though, when these structures give rise to
speech acts they enjoy it, and the egoic subject would quite prefer not to know anything
concerning the details of these processes.
This notion of “enjoyment,” or jouissance, is crucial to the Lacanian
understanding of how internalized regulations and demands concerning desire and
identity formation can lead to the development of psychoanalytic symptoms in the
individual. I will preface my discussion of jouissance, however, with a preliminary
articulation of Lacan’s three registers of the ‘Symbolic,’ the ‘Real,’ and the ‘Imaginary,’
as well as the general Lacanian theory of desire to which jouissance belongs. For now,
though the meaning of these terms will develop as I attend to Lacan’s thinking more
closely in my next chapter, I will identify the Symbolic as the unconscious seat of
language where inherited associations of meaning, prohibitions, and regulations of desire
are encoded; the Imaginary as the everyday warp and weft of one’s conscious, egoic
experiences; and the Real as the limit or interstices of what is recorded in either of the
former, that which enters consciousness only as a traumatic or enigmatic irruption.15 In
elaborating the role of the Symbolic, another of Fink’s formulations is quite helpful:
“Symbolic relations are those with the Other as language, knowledge, law, career,

15

When these terms are capitalized I mean them in the specifically Lacanian sense outlined here. This is to
avoid any ambiguity between the ordinary and Lacanian senses of the terms, especially in the case of the
Lacanian Real versus the real of common reality. The latter sense of reality belongs much more accurately
to the Imaginary.
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academia, authority, morality, ideals, and so on, and with the objects designated (or, more
strongly stated, demanded) by the Other: grades, diplomas, success, marriage, children –
all the things usually associated with anxiety in neurosis.”16 The Symbolic, understood in
this way, is not only the seat of language, but the locus of demands that one enjoy or
desire in particular ways, that one sustain oneself with fantasies about particular ideal
realizations of jouissance.
Lacan traces the origin of such unconscious demands back to the inauguration of
language and desire in infancy, where the infant’s relation to the Symbolic “mother” and
“father” first establishes the Symbolic register as the seat of the Other. In the earliest
stages of life, most famously theorized by Lacan in his early essay on the “mirror stage,”
the infant feels itself to be symbiotically unified with a primary caregiver, who thereby
occupies (or, more accurately, will come to occupy) the position of the Symbolic mother.
The infant feels all of its desires to be satisfied by this mother, while imagining
incorrectly that all of the mother’s desires are likewise satisfied by this relationship.
Moreover, because the infant does not perceive anything as lacking either in itself or in
its mother, it experiences this situation with a prevailing sense of being, fullness, and
stability. Eventually, this imagined situation of unity, satiety, and being is broken by the
realization that there is someone else in the world capable of diverting the attention of the
mother away by offering her some satisfaction that the infant cannot. This third person to
enter the scene occupies the position of the Symbolic father and initiates the infant’s
entry into the world of language by introducing the first signifier into the symbolic order:
the “Name-of-the-Father” (NF).

16

Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 87.
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Lacan describes the NF as “the signifier which, in the Other, qua locus of the
signifier, is the signifier of the Other qua locus of the Law.”17 This can be understood in
several ways. First, before this moment the infant did not require language to secure
either its material wellbeing or the desire of the mother (or so it thought). When the
father then steals the mother’s attention away and reveals that he possesses some
desirable quality that the infant lacks, the mutual satisfaction between infant and mother
is suddenly transformed from something taken for granted into something that must be
solicited and won. The “law” that is instantiated by the father’s disruption of this feeling
of unity is a prohibition (against unmediated satisfaction) that inaugurates linguistic
subjectivity as an obligatory game of Symbolic exchange, played to solicit attention,
recognition, and love. In this way the NF, the “Nom-du-Père,” is simultaneously the Noof-the-Father, the “Non-du-Père.” This subjection to the law of the Symbolic and the
wound it creates when it shatters the infant’s sense of being is the Lacanian sense of
castration. Crucially, instead of pure and unmediated satisfaction this new subjectivity of
language promises jouissance.
Jouissance should generally be understood as similar to the English term
“enjoyment,” but with the inclusion of the sexual connotations that the English phrase has
gradually lost.18 As Lacan’s thought progresses, the concept of jouissance moves beyond
an exclusively sexual meaning and takes on an increasingly dangerous, painful, and
threatening character associated with an increase in psychic tension,19 distinguishing it

Jacques Lacan, “On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis” in Écrits, trans. Bruce
Fink (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 485. (“Question”)
18
Translator Alan Sheridan’s commentary at the end of Lacan, Seminar XI, 281.
19
Dylan Evans, “From Kantian Ethics to Mystical Experience: An Exploration of Jouissance,” in Key
Concepts of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (New York: Other Press, 1998), 6-8.
17
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even further from the calming effect of mere pleasure denoted by the term plaisir. In
Freud’s terms, the pleasure principle is the basic psychic drive to achieve a state of
minimal tension and excitation; jouissance, as an enjoyment beyond mere pleasure that
comes at the cost of pain,20 lies decidedly beyond the pleasure principle in association
with death.
The kind of jouissance promised by the Symbolic order, then, is of a specifically
dampened and muted type, what is known in Lacanian parlance as “phallic” jouissance.
The “phallus” is an assumption by the infant, the unidentifiable Symbolic “x” the father
seems to have used to capture the mother’s attention and desire. This imagined “x” then
becomes the infant’s idealized object of desire. As the analyst Dylan Evans notes, “the
memory of the first impression of the mother’s complete jouissance will persist in the
illusion of a superabundant jouissance accessible only to the Other.”21 Essentially this
means that the infant’s experience of the inauguration of language sets up a lasting and
fundamental fantasy that perfect satisfaction is still possible in the world, and is indeed
enjoyed somewhere, somehow, by someone, but that this satisfaction must be pursued
according to the rules of Symbolic law. The phallus, then, is the ever-elusive Symbolic
attribute that each person pursues in their lifetime of Symbolic exchanges with others,
believing unconsciously that attaining it would finally restore them to the ideal state of
completion, satisfaction, and being from which they imagine they were torn. This
pursuit, in a word, is the Lacanian sense of neurotic desire. While the individual still
experiences mere pleasures (taste, touch, warmth, comfort, etc.), the engine of their desire
is fueled by the pursuit of an additional layer of Symbolically mediated jouissance that

20
21

Ibid., 6.
Ibid., 9.
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structures their world and gives life the character of an infinite approach to an elusive
promise of being and identity. Furthermore, as I will explore in detail in my next chapter,
the internal contradictions in the Other regarding the meanings, values, senses of identity,
and enjoyments it demands and prohibits, along with the individual’s inability to
adequately satisfy these demands, set up subjectivity and desire as inherently
symptomatic.
While this account of the individual’s relationship to the Other shows how
linguistic subjectivity internalizes and perpetuates certain demands regarding meaning,
value, and identity, it is also in this very relationship of jouissance to the Other that the
God hypothesis manifests itself. For Lacan, the problem is precisely the illusion,
described above, of “a superabundant jouissance accessible only to the Other” that
sustains one’s faith in the efficacy of the Symbolic order. To understand this properly
one must recall that the infant experiences its union with its mother as fullness,
completion, and the unmediated enjoyment of being. Though Symbolic law shatters this
imagined being and installs a sense of lack in the individual, a residual illusion is
unavoidably erected as an axiom of desire: somewhere, being still exists and enjoys itself
perfectly, without mediation. As the psychoanalyst Roberto Harari phrases it,
[L]anguage makes speech possible and thus always provokes a certain excavation or
extraction of jouissance, which pushes us into conceiving of the latter as something
absolute, from which we have been unfairly and temporarily separated. We do not accept
this, believing—this is also due to language—that somewhere that extraction has not

11

taken place, that there must be a totality and an Other, full, absolute jouissance to which
we can ultimately have access.22

To summarize, Lacan’s view is that the Symbolic order of language is an unconscious
network of valuations, meanings, and prohibitions which structure the direction and the
limits of each individual’s desire as an attempt to recover of a lost sense of being.
Undergirding this structure of desire is the fundamental unconscious belief that
somewhere in the depths of this order of reality there is a justifying exception: a perfect
being that enjoys absolutely. For Nietzsche, the lure of such illusions of being is the
symptom that has overwhelmed the history of Western thought.

1.2 Nietzsche’s critique of truth and the symptom of metaphysics
The broader picture of Nietzsche’s thought is perhaps most readily understood when one
views it through the lens of his critique of language, which interprets external reality as a
kind of artistic construction. Moreover, this aspect of Nietzsche’s thought offers an ideal
foundation for integrating his thought with Lacan’s. Just as Lacan believes that language
engenders a pathological desire for unattainable senses of being, Nietzsche suggests that
the inner logic of Western thought has historically trended towards an untenable
insistence upon permanence as the hallmark of truth and value. As I will show,
Nietzsche’s general position is that the idealization permanence and identity and the
disparaging of the ephemeral are unconsciously coded into language itself, such that
language disguises both its own character and the character of consciousness, thereby
perpetuating fatal misunderstandings which threaten the possibility of creativity and

22

Roberto Harari, How James Joyce Made his Name: A Reading of the Final Lacan, trans. Luke Thurston
(New York: Other Press, 2002), 91.
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freedom. Fundamentally, he takes this hidden ideology of language to operate according
to a religious logic: we collectively project an otherworldly domain of orderliness and
truth beyond the chaos of reality,23 and in doing so tacitly preserve the function of God as
the ground of this order even when we consciously abandon religiosity.
While Nietzsche’s thought is commonly broken into three distinct periods (an
early “metaphysical” period ranging from his time as a student through to the completion
of his Untimely Meditations eight years later, a “positivistic” period encompassing his
writing of the volumes of Human, All Too Human and Daybreak, and a “tragic” period of
immense productivity in the final seven years of his creative life), if one follows the
thread of his critique of language it is possible to recognize that he is centrally and
continuously concerned with the ways that linguistic subjectivity traps itself in certain
pathological errors. One of his very early unpublished essays, “On Truth and Lying in a
Non-Moral Sense” (TL), offers an initial articulation of these ideas that Nietzsche then
unfolds and elaborates over the course of his subsequent writings. The significance of
this trajectory, as I will show, is that the problems Nietzsche identifies through his
analysis of language lead him to, and become the basis of, his imbricated theories of
pathology, creativity, and the question of freedom – the nexus of Nietzsche’s ideas that
most fruitfully complements Lacan’s.
In TL Nietzsche focuses his critique on two related problems: first, the prevailing
biases of language towards identity and being, and second, the commonplace faith in
language as an adequate vehicle for the comprehension and articulation of objective truth.
These issues pertain to the problem of the death of God because Nietzsche characterizes

For example, the popular conception of mathematics as the inherent and independent “code” or
“operating system” of the universe, rather than a conceptual construction of human beings.
23
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belief in the independent order and consistency of reality as a psychological defense
against the problematically creative character of existence: “only because man forgets
himself as a subject, and indeed as an artistically creative subject, does he live with some
degree of peace, security, and consistency; if he could escape for just a moment from the
prison walls of this faith, it would mean the end of his ‘consciousness of self’.”24 Here
Nietzsche points out that accepting linguistic subjectivity to be a kind of grand aesthetic
artifice threatens not only the stability of meaning, but also the very stability of any
ordinary sense of self. On this point he is in agreement with Lacan, in the sense that
anything that might break the spell of the Symbolic order’s hold on the subject (any
disruption of the order of meaning and identification that mediates jouissance) would also
threaten to unravel the senses of being and identity that the Symbolic establishes as the
central desires of lived experience.25 As such, Nietzsche takes the entrenchment of the
ordinary understanding of language to be supported by the shelter it provides from the
problematic question of creativity.
Turning towards this problematic of creativity, Nietzsche offers a way into his
perspective through an analysis of the provenance of phenomenal experience. He
suggests that conscious experience can be understood as the product of layered acts of
translation that ultimately separate human reality from any objective or independent
reality that might be conceived beyond it:
[C]orrect perception – which would mean the full and adequate expression of an object in
the subject – is something contradictory and impossible; for between two absolutely

Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” in Birth of Tragedy and Other
Writings, ed. Raymond Guess and Ronald Speirs, trans. Ronald Spiers (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), 148. (TL)
25
One of the most central threads of my thesis consists in the articulation of this destabilization of identity
as the window of opportunity that Lacan and Nietzsche seek to do positive work within.
24
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different spheres, such as subject and object are, there is no causality, no correctness, no
expression, but at most an aesthetic way of relating, by which I mean an allusive
transference, a stammering translation into a quite different language.26

He believes, then, that the insurmountable distance and unknowability of any kind of
noumenal reality necessitates that the external objects of perception are subjectively
constructed phenomena. For Nietzsche, we do not receive impressions of external
objects as they are in and of themselves, but instead relate to the external world in a
thoroughly aesthetic way, through an artifice of creative translation that interprets and
constructs the very objects of our perception.
This process of aesthetic translation and interpretation is, for Nietzsche,
metaphorical. He takes up the example of the biological model of perception in order to
catch this process of aesthetic or metaphorical translation in the act:
The ‘thing-in-itself’ (which would be, precisely, pure truth, truth without consequences)
is impossible even for the creator of language to grasp, and indeed this is not at all
desirable. He designates only the relations of things to human beings, and in order to
express them he avails himself of the boldest metaphors. The stimulation of a nerve is
first translated into an image: first metaphor! The image is then imitated by a sound:
second metaphor! And each time there is a complete leap from one sphere into the heart
of another, new sphere.27

This suggests that the purported objectivity of phenomenal experience should not be
taken for granted. Sight begins with the stimulation of rods and cones in the eye, which
is then translated into the experience of an image. This is to say that Nietzsche takes the
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external objects of sight not to be transmitted to experience objectively, but rather passed
through an interpretive process of translation that stands at a significant step of removal
from external reality. Moreover, he takes the perceptions that provide us with the basis
for such biological models of perception to be interpretive translations themselves,
already transfigured into a uniquely human form of experience. In the words of one of
Nietzsche’s chief influences, the German philosopher Friedrich Lange, “Our visible
(bodily) organs are, like all other parts of the world of appearance, only pictures of an
unknown object.”28
While all of this is significant, the second act of translation described above, that
in which the “image is then imitated by a sound,” is the aspect of Nietzsche’s account
that ties the problem of perception to much deeper problems of language. The real force
of Nietzsche’s argument is that any experience of an external object, itself produced by a
“bold leap” from body to mind, is then traded for a signifier when the experience is
substituted by its translation into language. The conceptual experience of the human
being is thus (at least, on this account) two steps of removal from any supposed “thing in
itself”: first, the translation of an external world into sensory experience, and second, the
translation of that sensory experience into bits of language that boldly metaphorize even
this experience itself, the latter already a creative interpretation of something far more
elusive.
Nietzsche therefore problematizes the idea that conceptual experience
corresponds to the “truth” of things in any straightforwardly objective sense. Language
is, at best, metaphorical translation; it trades only in metaphors for thoroughly
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anthropomorphic experience, rather than objectively apprehended external objects. One
of Nietzsche’s most well-known passages asserts that this problem undermines the
traditional notion of truth itself:
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in
short a sum of human relations which have been subjected to poetic and rhetorical
intensification, translation, and decoration, and which, after they have been in use for a
long time, strike people as firmly established, canonical, and binding; truths are illusions
of which we have forgotten they are illusions… thus [people] lie unconsciously… and
precisely because of this unconsciousness, precisely because of this forgetting, they
arrive at the feeling of truth.29

Nietzsche holds that the traditional idea of “truth,” taken in the sense that true statements
achieve an adequate expression of or correspondence to an independently consistent and
objective reality, is a lie that conceals the creative artifice of experience. Whenever
Nietzsche critiques or disparages “metaphysics” it is precisely this dissimulation that he
has in mind, as this error is integral to all metaphysical belief in the inherent order and
self-identity of conceptual truth.
In opposition to the view of truth as an independent order of permanence and
identity, Nietzsche develops his thought around an understanding of truth that embraces
the inherent impermanence and transience of reality: “[The senses] do not lie at all. What
we make of their testimony, that alone introduces lies; for example, the lie of unity, the
lie of thinghood, of substance, of permanence… Insofar as the senses show becoming,
passing away, and change, they do not lie. But… being is an empty fiction. The
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‘apparent’ world is the only one: the ‘true’ world is merely added by a lie.”30 Nietzsche’s
perennial position, then, is that the artifice of our metaphorical and interpretive
construction of identity and being has disguised itself over time in the pursuit of a
comforting illusion of external order. What humanity has therefore hidden from itself is
its inherent creativity, the active role of linguistic subjectivity in the forging of all senses
of being and permanence.
For Nietzsche, this repression of creative responsibility amounts to an
unconscious preservation of the conceptual function of God. God, as the guarantor of the
eternal order of truth and meaning, haunts the structure of language insofar as the senses
of identity and being at play in conceptual experience are thought to belong to an external
order of reality. Since we deny both the artistic construction of our world of concepts
and the dependence of all identity and permanence upon this linguistic artifice, we
unwittingly preserve a religious logic of permanence and truth at the heart of reality.
Nietzsche’s account of God’s haunting of language is therefore somewhat different from
Lacan’s, but points towards the same conclusion: the language we inherit comes
bootstrapped with the logic that its signifiers efficaciously embody and correspond to an
order of objectivity, self-identity, and being, and this logic leads some of our
interpretations to be mistaken for unassailable truths. In Lacan’s words, “to say the truth
about truth is to say that it is a lie.”31
This problem of language, as I have suggested, eventually leads Nietzsche to
conclude that the lies humanity tells itself, though they do in many ways provide life with
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a livable veneer of simplicity, have grown over time into a set of convictions that render
life unlivable and become canonical and binding. In this sense, Nietzsche’s critique
targets the same structure of language identified by Lacan’s critique of phallic jouissance:
linguistic subjectivity pursues and enjoys fantasies of being and identity that the very
structure of language, the Symbolic law, demands. Moreover, while these fantasies do
serve to organize and mediate existence, the fixity of their perceived objectivity
engenders tremendous suffering precisely because it arrests creativity.
As a specific example, the Western sense of self as an enduring, self-identical “I”
endowed with an efficacious free will is a highly significant case, not only because it
exemplifies the duplicitous preservation of religious metaphysics (the self-identity and
free will of the soul), but also because this interpretation of the self significantly
conditions the ethical regulation of desire. Commenting on the error of this idea,
Nietzsche argues, “Our usual imprecise mode of observation takes a group of phenomena
as one and calls it a fact… it isolates every fact… belief in freedom of will…
presupposes that every individual action is isolate and indivisible; it is an atomism in the
domain of willing and knowing.”32 This helps to demonstrate the sense in which
projections of identity come to constrain human existence. In truth, objects and events
bleed into one another; any human action is conditioned by a vast history that leads up to
it, each human organism is a dynamic event that constantly exchanges matter and energy
with its environment, and so on. In place of such a complicated view of things, we tend
to treat people as if their actions were somehow causally separate from such capricious
conditions as biology or history.
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The real problem with this is not that humanity remains wedded to distortions or
misunderstandings of itself, but that the fixity of these distortions tends to doom people to
limited and symptomatic horizons. In Nietzsche’s words, “Today we no longer have any
pity for the concept of ‘free will’: we know only too well what it really is—the foulest of
all theologian’s artifices, aimed at making mankind ‘responsible’ in their sense…
Wherever responsibilities are sought, it is usually the instinct of wanting to be judge and
punish which is at work.”33 The issue, then, is that the identity and free will attributed to
the self leads directly into the trap of neurotic guilt and shame. One imagines oneself to
be free to enact the virtues demanded by the Other but remains continuously confronted
with the failure to live up to this ideal self-image, and even accepts punishment for this
failure as justified. Nietzsche, like Lacan, recognizes that God’s haunting of language
produces a fundamental neurosis in linguistic subjectivity, and believes that these
problems must be overcome together: “That nobody is held responsible any longer, that
the mode of being may not be traced back to a causa prima… that alone is the great
liberation; with this alone is the innocence of becoming restored. The concept of ‘God’
was until now the greatest objection to existence. We deny God, we deny the
responsibility in god: only thereby do we redeem the world.”34 The disguised religious
logic of language, on Nietzsche’s view, binds subjectivity to a fixed and symptomatic
horizon of identity and value.
In summary, then, Nietzsche and Lacan both believe that the task of overcoming
God must be realized through a certain overcoming of linguistic subjectivity itself, at
least so long as language continues to reproduce the metaphysical logic of religion. In
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this shared diagnostic framework, we see that Nietzsche and Lacan each theorize how an
individual might be able to overcome the senses of identity and meaning demanded by
the Other and cultivate a creative agency in the spheres of meaning, identity, and desire.
At its core, the possibility of such creativity depends upon the efficacy of sublimation.

1.3 Nihilism as a crisis of sublimation35
The problem of nihilism as a mortal threat to creativity is illuminated by the integration
of Nietzsche’s and Lacan’s theories. Nietzsche’s most noteworthy translator and
commentator in Anglo-American philosophy, Walter Kaufmann, suggests that theorizing
the escape from nihilism is Nietzsche’s “greatest and most persistent problem,”36 and that
this fundamental problem is one of values.37 Lacan, on the other hand, does not take up
the mantle of the problem of nihilism in Nietzsche’s sense, but rather remains focused on
exploring the individual’s symptomatic relationship to language and the Other. These
two approaches converge, however, as soon as one rephrases the problem: how can one
understand the capacity of the individual to create values that are not sanctioned by
Symbolic law? Moreover, what might prohibit or foreclose the possibility of such
creativity? In other words, how can an individual desire creatively in a way that is well
and truly their own rather than having their desire dictated by the language of the Other?
Such creativity in the realm of desire is the Lacanian sense of sublimation and precisely
what Nietzsche takes to be threatened by nihilism.
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Zupančič argues that “with the ‘death of God,’ we get a Symbolic deprived of its
inherent power, a Symbolic that does not manage to create or produce anything with its
rituals,” such that one can understand the problem of values as “the absence of a power or
mechanism for creating values.”38 This means that the Lacanian sense of sublimation, to
which I attend in more detail below, is the creative affirmation or actualization of a desire
beyond those deemed valuable or possible by the Other. The stakes of such creative
sublimation, meanwhile, are intensified by Nietzsche’s argument that this creative
capacity might come to be irrevocably lost.
Nietzsche describes the threat to sublimation looming on the horizon of history in
terms of a kind of collapse of desire: “Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer
shoot the arrow of his longing beyond man, and the string of his bow will have forgotten
how to whir!”39 This warning suggests that the creative powers of humanity are on the
verge of atrophying irreversibly from disuse. To phrase things in terms of the problem of
language, Nietzsche believes that humanity may one day prove to have inescapably
walled itself into a corner by committing to a final interpretation of reality that totally
prohibits the creation of anything beyond it.
The image of the bowstring in the passage just quoted has rich connections to the
notion of the psychic tension of jouissance as the painful but necessary vehicle of
creativity. Nietzsche often describes such tension as chaos: “I say unto you: one must
still have chaos in oneself to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have
chaos in yourselves.”40 This image evokes the notion of humanity learning to illuminate
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reality anew, thus relieving God and the Good of such duties. The passage continues,
however, with a description of the impending loss of all such creative tension: “Alas, the
time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of the most
despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, I show
you the last man. ‘What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?’
thus asks the last man, and he blinks… ‘We have invented happiness,’ say the last men,
and they blink.”41 Here, the stakes of nihilism are articulated as the potential collapse of
even the ability to imagine any senses of value, meaning, or purpose that might be better,
more potent, or more beautiful than those that currently prevail. Furthermore, the finality
of the mantra of this collapse of creativity, “We have invented happiness,” points back to
Lacan’s suggestion that the demands of the Other are given weight by the subject’s
presumption of a totalizing consistency at the heart of Symbolic law.
The potential collapse of the capacity to create new values expressed by the idea
of the last man, translated into psychoanalytic terms, corresponds to the threat of a reality
principle winning out against all others and becoming irreversibly entrenched. Zupančič
defines the reality principle as that which “‘self-evidently’ functions as the limit of the
possible.”42 If the Symbolic order is the locus of meaning and value in language, then the
reality principle is that aspect of the Symbolic that permits or prohibits the recognition or
possibility of potential organizations of value and desire. Zupančič suggests that “the
reality principle is not simply some kind of natural way associated with how things are…
The reality principle itself is ideologically mediated; one could even claim that it
constitutes the highest form of ideology, the ideology that presents itself as empirical fact
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or (biological, economic…) necessity (and that we tend to perceive as nonideological).”43
This sense of the reality principle is precisely the entrenchment of interpretation-becomefact that Nietzsche attempts to illuminate: the hegemony of an interpretation of reality
that refuses to admit either its own status as interpretation or the validity (that is,
possibility) of interpretations or valuations that challenge its totality.
The problem with the contemporary reality principle, from this perspective, is not
only that it denies the possibility of new values, interpretations, or desires, but also that
even neurotic desire begins to deflate and malfunction when the Other demands that one
enjoy the last man’s “invented happiness” as perfected, ubiquitous, and final. Zupančič
articulates this problem well, writing,
It seems as if we were dealing with some perverse delight concerning the fact that we
have finally reached the point where nothing (other) is possible, and can thus peacefully
enjoy our lives… let us give up on our [own] desire, and we will no longer be prey to all
the difficult (and ‘ideological’) choices with which our desire confronts us—Wrong! The
result is, instead, that we no longer have a moment’s peace… since there is nothing
beyond the reality (principle), we have to enjoy each and every moment of it. And there
is no need to point out that this imperative of enjoyment is the surest way to make any
enjoyment impossible.44

The implication of this reading is that even the economy of phallic jouissance is only
enjoyable when it is open to creative exceptions, when the possibility of creativity and
novelty in the domain of value and desire remains open. Rather than offering a utopia of
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enjoyment, an overly tyrannical reality principle short-circuits desire and hollows out the
character of human life by undermining even the very enjoyment it demands.
Lacan theorizes sublimation as an ethical path of action that leads beyond such a
hegemonic stasis of desire and value. In its unique Lacanian sense, sublimation is the
process by which values that are prohibited or unrecognized by the reality principle are
insisted upon and elevated by individuals in a refusal to yield to prohibitive norms.
Insofar as this process is taken as the primary mechanism of creating new values,
sublimation has a necessarily ethical dimension. Zupančič describes Lacanian
sublimation as “the creation of a certain space, scene, or ‘stage’ that enables us to value
something that is situated beyond the reality principle, as well as beyond the principle of
the common good,” adding, “It is at this point that sublimation is related to ethics.”45 To
grasp this properly one must understand the difference between Lacanian sublimation and
the sense of sublimation as it is ordinarily conceived.
The commonplace understanding of sublimation usually denotes the channeling
of sexual or destructive drives into activities that benefit the common good, thereby
harmonizing the individual with the order of the reality principle. Joan Copjec describes
this as “the vulgar misinterpretation of sublimation.”46 Instead, she suggests, sublimation
in its Lacanian sense ought to be conceived as a process by which a drive achieves a kind
of construction of its object: “There could not be a better description of drive/sublimation
[than this]: it so wills what occurs that the object it finds is indistinguishable from the one
it chooses. Construction and discovery, thinking and being, as well as drive and object

45

Ibid., 78.
Joan Copjec, Imagine There’s No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
2002), 57.
46

25

are soldered together.”47 This notion of sublimation is informed by Lacan’s critique of
traditional ontology, which he often attempts to communicate by challenging the central
senses of being and identity that populate the domain of sexuality. Woman does not
exist,48 and there is no sexual relationship,49 Lacan says. Copjec argues that what is truly
striking about such claims is their “reliance on a definition of being as plural and partial,
as small objects of the drive… The ethics of psychoanalysis follows from its fundamental
critique of ontology… This ethics concerns the subject’s relation to these small pieces of
being, not primarily its relation to other people or to the Other.”50 Taken in this way,
sublimation is not a challenge addressed to the Other. Instead, it primarily involves the
insistence of a certain creativity in the drive’s relation to its object; sublimation therefore
describes the way that desire mobilizes the artifice of truth to the effect of simultaneously
discovering and constructing its object. By doing so, sublimation separates thought
“from the supposed subject of knowledge, that is, from the Other. For, the satisfaction of
the drive by sublimation testifies to the autonomy of the subject, her independence from
the Other.”51 As such, this creative discovery of the object of desire instantiates a
localized and partial sense of being that disrupts the totalizing character of the Other’s
knowledge.
In his seventh seminar on ethics, Lacan takes up a discussion of Kant that serves
to illustrate this idea of sublimation more concretely. He discusses a thought experiment
of Kant’s, in which a hypothetical man has been given the choice to sleep with the
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woman of his dreams at the penalty of execution.52 In her commentary on this example,
Zupančič suggests that if the man “opts for death, the reason for this is not necessarily his
inability to renounce pleasure: in the given circumstances, the choice of pleasure… is the
only way for him to show that he is able to act contrary to… the reality principle… If this
man were to act as Kant suggests… he would embrace the pleasure principle as the
ultimate principle of his action.”53 In this sense, the dangerous act of identifying with a
desire that moves beyond the safety of Symbolic law can be counted as ethical insofar as
it insists upon the dignity and reality of a deeply personal truth of desire.
The conception of sublimation as a kind of creative artifice, then, draws
Nietzsche’s and Lacan’s thought together around a shared reconceptualization of truth
and ontology that aims to protect and foster creativity as such. Lacanian sublimation is,
in Zupančič’s words, “not only a creation of some new good, but also (and principally)
the creation and maintenance of a certain space for objects that have no place in the
given, extant reality, objects that are considered ‘impossible.’”54 Nietzsche’s thought
appreciates and enacts the understanding of linguistic subjectivity at play in this pursuit
of truths beyond the rule of the Other. As Zupančič suggests, “Nietzsche’s bet on
appearance is not a bet on appearance against truth,” but rather “a bet on truth as inherent
to appearance,”55 in the sense that “the Real is inherent to truth as its inner limit, as what
redoubles truth into knowledge.”56 As the rest of my thesis will demonstrate, Lacan’s
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theory of the sinthome and Nietzsche’s tragic theory of self-overcoming stand as
complementary and interrelated attempts to open, unfold, and transmit the possibility of
such creative manipulations of the Real in order to liberate the subject’s relationship to
truth and desire.

1.4 The sinthome and self-overcoming as responses to the death of God
Lacan’s idea of the sinthome represents the final development of his theory of
sublimation, and therefore his final creative response to the problem of God in language
in the sense outlined above. Nietzsche, too, develops his tragic philosophy of selfovercoming as an attempt to creatively overcome this same problem. While the extant
texts on the Nietzsche-Lacan connection mentioned at the outset of this chapter go quite
far in developing a dialogue between the two, not one of them does any serious work
with Lacan’s idea of the sinthome, the central and transformative concept of his final
seminars. As the rest of my thesis will show, Lacan’s reconceptualization of sublimation
through the idea of the sinthome provides a remarkable and untapped framework for
exploring the connections between Nietzsche and Lacan that stands to clarify and amplify
the trajectories of their thought.
To this end, my next chapter is a careful explication of the theory of the sinthome
as it appears in Lacan’s Seminar XXIII: The Sinthome. Essentially, the revolutionary idea
of the sinthome is that psychoanalytic discourse must aim to overturn the symptomatic
experience of the language of the Other by bringing the analysand to identify with their
symptom in a very novel sense. By so doing, the analysand is able to move beyond the
neurotic pursuit of the senses of meaning, identity, and being that Symbolic exchange
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ordinarily offers in favour of establishing a totally unique and singular organization of
desire. This psychological shift primarily consists in the subject coming to hold open the
space of the Real of language, such that the ossified network of meaning encoded into the
Other and its reality principle gives way to the possibility of a poetic freedom of desire.
All of this amounts to a model of how an individual is able to rewrite their relationship to
God and language to the effect of becoming responsible for the foundational aspects of
jouissance that are related to the Name-of-the-Father in a creative and liberating way.
The third chapter of my thesis then applies the specific insights of the sinthome to
the philosophy of Nietzsche’s tragic period. I approach this by exploring the possibility
of a sinthomatic reading of Nietzsche’s thought at three levels. First, I examine the
theoretical aspect of Nietzsche’s late writings in order to establish the compatibility
between his mature understanding of language, truth, and consciousness with the key
tenets of Lacan’s theory of the sinthome. Second, I explore Nietzsche’s relationship to
the Greek god Dionysus and argue that the figure of this god can be taken, in effect, as a
site of Nietzsche’s personal act of sinthomatic identification and writing. Finally, I
explore Nietzsche’s teachings of self-overcoming as they appear in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, where he strives to impart his tragic wisdom of creativity to others in a
thoroughly sinthomatic way.
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Chapter Two: Desire, Creativity, and Truth in Lacan’s Sinthome
2.1 Introduction
Lacan’s theory of the sinthome, articulated most fully towards the end of his life in
Seminar XXIII: The Sinthome of 1975-76, stands as the last great turning point in his
thought. Generally, Lacanian psychoanalysis is an attempt to understand the relationship
between desire and the unconscious in individual subjects in the sense articulated in my
previous chapter. Accordingly, the central clinical problem of psychoanalysis is the
“symptom,” some object of desire that is known by the unconscious but manifests in
conscious experience as a strange problem, a disturbing pattern of behaviour or thought
that persists, repeats, and produces unease or suffering through its discord with egoic
experience at the level of the Imaginary. The sinthome is a watershed idea in Lacanian
thought because it reconceptualizes the symptom as a possible kernel of utterly unique,
singular, and personal desire, as opposed to conceiving of the symptom as an unrealized
demand inherited from the Other. If the symptom is merely an unconscious yearning for
some Symbolic satisfaction demanded by the Other then it is something to be decoded,
unraveled, and ultimately escaped or overcome. If, on the other hand, the symptom
troubles the subject precisely because it is the seed of a desire for something the reality
principle deems impossible then it is something to be uncovered, realized, and identified
with as an engine of creativity and liberation. The heresy of liberating one’s desire by
identifying with such a symptom is the transfiguration of the symptom through the
writing of the sinthome.
Lacan’s shift from his earlier theories of the symptom to the discussion of the
sinthome in his later years embodies the spirit of experimentalism that pervades the
30

whole of his thought. This same experimentalism also characterizes Nietzsche’s thought
and, in both cases, demands that the reader strive to keep a holistic view in mind when
attending to any particularly novel text or concept.57 Walter Kaufmann emphasizes the
importance of this experimentalism,58 and his characterization of this style as “problem”
or “dialectical” thought applies equally to Nietzsche and Lacan: “Nietzsche is… not a
system-thinker but a problem thinker… The starting point of such a “dialectical” inquiry
is not a set of premises but a problem situation… premises are involved, and some of
these are made explicit in the course of the inquiry. The result is less a solution of the
initial problem than a realization of its limitations: typically, the problem is not solved
but ‘outgrown.’”59
The broader challenge, then, is that neither Lacan nor Nietzsche should be
understood as ever having arrived at the position of a finished system. In Lacan’s case,
he is always working through problems in such a way that his newer thought
problematizes and rearranges what comes before it. Bruce Fink suggests that “we should
admire… not the final product but the flow or process of Lacan’s writing: its twists and
turns, recursive style, and movement… a teaching worthy of the name must not end with
the creation of a perfect, complete system… a genuine teaching continues to evolve, to
call itself into question, to forge new concepts.”60 Indeed, as Fink notes, this was also
how Lacan approached Freud’s works.61 Lacan writes of Freud, “let us not stop at the
labels on the drawers, although many people confuse them with the fruits of science. Let
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us read the texts; let us follow Freud’s thinking in the twists and turns it imposes on us,
and not forget that, in deploring them himself compared with an ideal of scientific
discourse, he claims that he was forced into them by the object of his study.”62 Lacan’s
oft-stated intent of a “return to Freud” marks an attempt to follow the delicate turns in
Freud’s thought, to move beyond the orthodoxy of Freudian analysts and appreciate the
dynamism of Freud’s pursuit of consciousness and subjectivity as problematic objects.
The twists and turns of Lacan’s thought leading up to the final scene of
ponderings and insights surrounding the sinthome can be laid out as following three
general stages, each grounded upon a different approach in Lacanian analysis towards the
theorization and treatment of the symptom. As Roberto Harari suggests, these three
stages are “that of the interpreted symptom; that of the traversed fantasy; and that of the
sinthome as identification.”63 I begin this chapter by laying out these two first stages of
Lacan’s theorization of the symptom in order to then establish the sinthome, in the proper
context of its origins, as a turn towards a new set of problems and goals. Following from
this, my discussion of the sinthome more carefully elaborates several ideas presented in
my previous chapter, namely, the Lacanian sense of the relationship between truth and
the Real, the function (or dysfunction) of God in language involving the Name-of-theFather (NF), and the sinthome as a new interpretation of the stakes, mechanisms, and
outcomes of the liberation of desire involved in sublimation. The articulation of these
ideas in the present chapter will lay the groundwork for a close reading of Nietzsche in
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my third chapter, where I examine Nietzsche’s tragic and Dionysian theory of selfovercoming in its relationship to Lacan’s theory of the sinthome.

2.2 The two early phases of Lacan’s treatment of the symptom
In Lacan’s early thought, a symptom, simply put, is a demand to desire and enjoy an
object in a disturbing way that is expressed or felt in the egoic consciousness of the
Imaginary but has an origin or mainspring in the Symbolic which cannot be traced or
understood by its sufferer. Fink writes, “In Lacan’s early work the goal of analysis for
neurotics is to eliminate the interference in symbolic relations created by imaginary
relations, in other words, to get imaginary interests out of the way so as to confront the
analysand with his or her problems with the Other as such.”64 This suggests that the
problems the subject grapples with at the level of inherited Symbolic prohibitions and
demands are obfuscated by egoic experience. This obfuscation is possible on Lacan’s
view because the symptom, at this early stage of his thinking, has the structure of a
metaphor to be deciphered. A symptomatic behaviour, be it an inappropriate response to
certain stimuli, a compulsion to excessively repeat a certain action, or a disturbing pattern
of thought that asserts itself repeatedly, plays out persistently because there exists in the
unconscious some unattainable desire that approximates its satisfaction and relief through
the metaphorical substitution of a symptom in place of proper satisfaction. The
symptom, then, is merely a metaphorical substitute for a deeper yearning that the subject
cannot face directly; this metaphorical substitution can be understood as repression in the
Lacanian sense.
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In this period, which roughly runs from Lacan’s first essays in the 1950s until his
eleventh seminar in 1964, Lacan’s clinical aim is to bring the neurotic sufferer to see
through the metaphor of the symptom in order to recognize and name the pernicious
desire that issues the symptom’s irresistible demand. In an early 1957-58 paper that
characterizes this stage of his thought Lacan offers the following:
The fact that the question of his existence envelops the subject, props him up, invades
him, and even tears him apart from every angle, is revealed to the analyst by the tensions,
suspense, and fantasies that he encounters. It should be added that this question is
articulated in the Other in the form of elements of a particular discourse. It is because
these phenomena are organized in accordance with the figures of this discourse that they
have the fixity of symptoms and that they are legible and dissolve when deciphered.65

A “discourse” in this context means a particular configuration of Symbolic exchange that
produces desire. This passage shows that the subject’s desperate attempts to achieve an
ideal enjoyment of consistency and being are structured by the demands of the Other that
circulate in discourse. These demands, for the most part, remain hidden in plain sight,
veiled by a gloss of metaphor that allows a false semblance of sense and unity to be
afforded to the experience of the everyday. The inconsistency of such demands (for
example, the simultaneous demands that a woman be both classically feminine and
worthy of fascination, such that one must, impossibly, be womanly without being plain or
“basic,” while also exuding a pleasing novelty that is neither unwomanly nor butch)
ensures that some of these ideals will be unrealizable and lead to the compensatory
response of symptom formation. So long as such a symptom has the structure of a
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metaphor to be deciphered, Lacan believes neurotics can dissolve the symptom by
decoding and recognizing the demands that structure their desire.
In the next phase of Lacan’s thought, beginning roughly with his eleventh seminar
in 1964, the goal of analysis is no longer to decipher the metaphor of the symptom, but
rather to “traverse the fantasy” that undergirds and surrounds it.66 The impetus for this
shift in his thinking is the realization that the dissolution of any one symptom is far from
the most fruitful result of psychoanalytic therapy. Instead, Lacan asks, how could
someone be brought to the point where becoming caught in the mire of an indecipherable
symptom would no longer be a threat, and what method of approach would this require?
It is useful here to evoke a well-known statement of Freud’s, “Wo es war, soll Ich
werden,” “Where it was, I shall be.” Freud’s “es” and “Ich” have traditionally been
translated into English as “id” and “ego.” This corresponds to the common interpretation
of Freud that suggests egoic consciousness should be strengthened to take over regions
and processes of thought previously dominated by the unconscious, the latter being the
psychological “it” in the sense of “not me, the ego.” What Lacan aims at through the
traversal of the subject’s fantasy, though, is not the strengthening of the ego, but rather a
new way of responding to the dominance of the Other in the unconscious. In
philosophical terms, Lacan’s path is closer to a more literal translation of Freud’s
statement above, as the latter uses the verb “werden,” “to become,” rather than “sein,” “to
be.” Thus, to render Freud’s phrase differently, one could phrase the Lacanian dictum as
“where it [the unconscious] was, there I shall become,” with become indicating not the
illusory sense of completeness after which the ego strives, but a continual and dynamic
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process of becoming and change that negotiates between the problematic forces of the
ego and the unconscious alike.
This new end of analysis is to be realized through the traversal of the subject’s
fundamental fantasy, which, by Lacan’s lights, is the fundamental structure of jouissance
and desire involved in the God hypothesis I discussed in my previous chapter. The
subject believes that they have been unfairly severed from an ideal state of being and
enjoyment, and the fundamental fantasy is that this state can ultimately be recovered
through acceding to the Other’s demands.67 Fink describes the traversal of this fantasy as
follows: “Neurosis is maintained in discourse, and we see in Lacan’s notion of traversing
fantasy the suggestion of a kind of beyond of neurosis in which the subject is able to act
(as cause, as desirousness), and is at least momentarily out of discourse, split off from
discourse: free from the weight of the Other.”68 Discourse, in Lacan’s thinking, always
refers to a structure in the circulation of meaning, and the possible jouissance derived
therefrom, which must be understood as a “social link” in the sense that it organizes
identification and desire at an interpersonal level. Lacan writes, “the notion of discourse
should be taken as a social link, founded on language, and thus seems not unrelated to
what is specified in linguistics as grammar.”69 This evocation of grammar gestures
towards the way that any discourse succeeds in erecting its own logic or truth,
engendering a phallic satisfaction that is derived from participating in and perpetuating a
particular organization of language, meaning, and identity. This stands in metaphorical
relation to grammar, as the rules of the game in any particular discourse are intuitive, i.e.
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unconscious, and develop over time in ways that are, like grammar, organic and subject
to the accumulation of contradictory exceptions. These rules regulate a certain
arrangement of the relationship of jouissance to language that remains hidden from
Imaginary experience until it is forced into the open. Fink argues, “Every discourse
requires a loss of jouissance and has its own mainspring or truth (often carefully
dissimulated). Each discourse defines that loss differently, starting from a different
mainspring.”70 The “loss of jouissance” required by participation in a particular
discourse mirrors the initial loss of jouissance in the inauguration of language, where the
ideal of unmediated satiety in union with the mother is interrupted by a new law
regulating access to jouissance. The satiety of desire is interrupted by the imposition of
the rules of a new linguistic game that must be played to access the enjoyment it
promises. Just as in the case of the infant, the jouissance sacrificed in discourse is not
recovered for the Imaginary ego, but rather trapped in the unconscious machinations of
discourse such that it binds the subject to them unwittingly. The satisfaction of discourse
is, for this reason, Symbolic.
As for the “cause” of desire, this is the false truth or justification experienced at
the level of the Imaginary that each discourse offers concerning the motivation and
justification of its imposition. In the discourse of the Oedipal scene of the Symbolic
mother and father, the perceived object of desire, or “object-cause” of the new regulation
of jouissance, is the Symbolic power and jouissance that knowledge of language and
sociality promise to deliver back into the infant’s life. The truth of this first discourse is
that the infant is rendered as perpetually lacking, bound to attempt in vain to fill the gaps
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of imperfection that will ultimately prevent the egoic self, no matter how complete it may
become, from having access to the ideal of unmediated jouissance from which it
imagines it was severed.
If the traversal of fantasy is to arrive at “a kind of beyond of neurosis in which the
subject is able to act (as cause, as desirousness)… free from the weight of the Other,”71
then it must consist in guiding the subject into awareness of the very problem of
discourse and the demands of the Other. In order to be free of the weight of the Other,
the subject must step outside of the safety of the ego and the calming satisfaction of
Symbolic exchange in order to see and understand their very participation in discourse
and symptom formation. When this is achieved, the ego and the unconscious alike have
been “subjectivized,” in the sense that the complicity of the individual in arrangements of
jouissance and desire is unveiled. The result of this process, then, is that a subject armed
with this new knowledge can have a chance to act as truly desirous, as the cause and
actualization of their own desire, free from the demands of discourse and the Other.
Since this describes the successful end of an analysis, any example of such a
transformation would necessarily be grounded in the particularities of the analysand’s life
and world. Still, one might imagine a person who comes to understand that some central
desire in their life, say, monetary success at the expense of personal fulfilment, is in fact
not something that is truly expected of them by any authorities other than those they have
internalized and, in fact, enjoyed at some level. What must occur in the psychoanalytic
clinic between analyst and analysand to achieve such a shift is the working through of the
analysand’s fantasies of enjoyment, recognition, shame, guilt, and so on, until the
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analysand’s symptomatic relationship to desire and Symbolic relations can be revealed as
a process and practice that they have actively participated in.
In the move from the first to the second stage of Lacan’s response to the problem
of the symptom one can trace a movement from a more localized theory and practice to a
more generalized one, from the deciphering and dissolution of the symptom as an
immediate personal ailment to the goal of producing a change in the subject’s overall
awareness of the operations of language and desire. This marks a shift in Lacan’s
thinking from an original focus on the egoic relations and structures of the Imaginary to
one concerned with the larger relationships between the subject and forces of language
seated in the register of the Symbolic.72 Along this same trajectory, Lacan’s final turn
towards the sinthome can likewise be characterized as a shift of focus towards the register
of the Real, particularly concerning the Real’s crucial relationship to truth and the
psychological process of “foreclosure” normally associated with psychosis.

2.3 The Real of psychosis
Before his theorization of the sinthome, Lacan takes the primary mechanism of neurosis
to be the repression of desire in the sense of metaphorical substitution discussed above,
while he distinguishes psychosis through its rootedness in the mechanism of foreclosure.
He writes,
I teach that the Other is the locus of the kind of memory [Freud] discovered by the name
“unconscious,” memory that he regards as the object of a question that has remained
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unanswered, insofar as it conditions the indestructibility of certain desires… It is an
accident in this register and in what occurs in it – namely, the foreclosure of the Nameof-the-Father in the place of the Other – and the failure of the paternal metaphor that I
designate as the defect that gives psychosis its essential condition, along with the
structure that separates it from neurosis.73

In this theory of psychosis, the NF is ejected from the Symbolic by the mechanism of
foreclosure. As Russel Grigg suggests, “what is foreclosed is not the possibility of an
event's coming to pass, but the very signifier, or signifiers, that makes the expression of
impossibility possible... Thus, 'foreclosure' refers not to the fact that a speaker makes a
statement which declares something impossible… but to the fact that the speaker lacks
the very linguistic means for making the statement at all.”74 In this way, the foreclosure
of the NF must be understood as a refusal so utterly final that there is simply no trace of
the ejected signifier left in the Symbolic register, such that the signifier is completely
missing.
The immediate consequences of this foreclosure are twofold. First, the formation
of language as a system of metaphor never gets off the ground. In all of Lacan’s thought
before the sinthome, this “failure of the paternal metaphor” results in the failure of
metaphor writ large, as the original inauguration of desire by the NF as the Non-du-père
and the regulative pursuit of phallic jouissance through Symbolic relations never takes
place. The second consequence of the failure of the NF is that the jouissance of the
individual remains unregulated. As articulated in my previous chapter, the reality
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principle of the Other and the phallic jouissance it engenders achieve a kind of pacifying
regulation of the subject. In Harari’s words, “the Name-of-the-Father… like everything
connected with the Symbolic, implies a calming effect.”75 In psychosis, however, the
absence of any pacifying limit on jouissance routinely leads to torturous and disastrous
results. With no effective regulation of desire in place, no phallic mediation of the raw
force of lived experience, the subject continuously experiences the full weight (or
weightlessness) of the joy, pain, beauty, and horror of existence.
Where the Real fits into this account of psychosis is on the side of language that is
not wholly meaningful and not exhausted by signification and the function of metaphor:
the materiality of the letter. Fink writes that “the letter, in [Lacan’s thought of] the
1970s… [is] the material, nonsignifying face of the signifier, the part that has effects
without signifying: jouissance effects. The letter is related to the materiality of
language.”76 In this theory of psychosis meaning has, in a sense, fallen away from
language, but the materiality of language that remains is not without effects relating to
jouissance. To quote Fink again,
[Words] may be strung together in perfectly ordinary ways by a psychotic, but they do
not seem to affect him or her in any sense; they are somehow independent of him or her.
Whereas a neurotic may, upon hearing an unusual term… be reminded of the first time he
heard the word, who it was he learned it from, and so on, a psychotic may focus on its
strictly phonetic or sonic aspect. He may see meaning in nothing, or find a purely
personal meaning in virtually everything. Words are taken as things, as real objects.77
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The “words” at play in this context are words as signifiers, bearers of meaning, and it is
therefore the meaning effects of language that are missing in psychosis. As a material
thing, though, the letter of the word is still encountered, only as something Real. This
experience of language is available to everyone in day to day life in the circumstance of
repeating a word until its meaning seems to fall away, while for the psychotic this may be
the primary experience of language. As I will show, the experience of this material Real
of language is a central aspect of sinthomatic subjectivity.

2.4 Lacanian “writing”: the Real and the limits of truth and meaning
The sinthome represents a significant turning point in Lacan’s work in several ways,
especially in light of the trajectory of the first two phases of Lacan’s treatment of the
symptom outlined above. As Dylan Evans suggests, “Whereas Lacan had seen the
symptom in the 1950’s as a message to be deciphered and dissolved, the sinthome
designates a signifying formulation beyond analysis, a kernel of enjoyment immune to
the efficacy of the symbolic.”78 As Evans’ formulation implies, the sinthome represents a
kind of freedom from the strictures of the Symbolic. Since the Symbolic is the register
where knowledge of the Other’s demands for being, meaning, and identification are
encoded, the freedom of the sinthome involves the manipulation and overcoming of the
limits of the possible set by Symbolic law and the reality principle, and therefore amounts
to a manipulation of the Real. This process of playing with the limits of meaning and
truth through the manipulation of the Real is what is known as “writing” in its
specifically Lacanian sense, which is centrally important because the sinthome is
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characterized throughout Seminar XXIII as something that is “written” or “forged.” Since
such acts of “writing” are the central mechanism of the achievement of sinthomatic
subjectivity they must be understood not only in their relationship to the ethics of
sublimation, but also in terms of their relation to the psyche and the structure of truth
itself.
The ethical character of the sinthome, as I have mentioned, should be understood
as Lacan’s elaboration of his earlier theory of sublimation. In both cases, the sense of
ethics involved consists in the defiant act of choosing the inherent danger of creative
desire over the calming satisfaction of the Symbolic. Evans writes, “not all human
decisions are governed by a ‘rational’ calculation in which potential pleasure is weighed
against potential pain… The deal of [non-phallic] jouissance is not always rejected…
[such] jouissance would be located on the side of the ethical, ‘given that jouissance
implies precisely the acceptance of death.’”79 The defiant affirmation of desire and
jouissance beyond the safety of the established Symbolic order involves the risk of pain,
chaotic tension, and the “death” or dissolution of the ego's safe havens of identification.
It is because such acts involve risk and the sacrifice of safety in the name of change and
freedom that these acts have an ethical character.
It is, however, important to note that “we must not simply confuse jouissance
with the pursuit of death or masochism… The increase of tension does not necessarily
imply suffering, just as its diminution does not always lead to a feeling of well-being.”80
The relation between the reality principle’s placations and the acceptance of a kind of
death (or, as I will explain later, unknotting) is not so clear-cut as a choice between
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comfort and pain. The remarkable prose of James Joyce, the central inspiration and case
study of Seminar XXIII, indicates to Lacan a kind of jouissance far beyond the reaches of
the Symbolic order and its strict laws of meaning and identity. In keeping with the idea
that the chaos of jouissance beyond the Symbolic is not necessarily painful, Harari notes
that Joyce’s own journey into sinthomatic consciousness was far from horrific: “as he
wrote, he allegedly laughed continually, showed unbridled jouissance.”81 This is in stark
contrast to Harari’s own account of experiences beyond Symbolic mediation, as he
writes, “Reality is centered on what is collective, what is codified somewhere between
the Symbolic and the Imaginary, what allows us to establish forms of agreement and
consensus. In this sense, reality is asleep – it keeps us in a sort of comfortable haze, from
which we are torn by the Real, which wakes us screaming.”82 In this sense, the ethical
stance of the sinthome stages an encounter with unmediated jouissance and the Real of
language that, while threatening to Symbolic senses of identity, has the potential to be
joyous, and it is the subject’s rebellious insistence on the possibility of such joy that gives
the sinthome its ethical character.
The encounter with the Real of language just described must be understood in its
relation to the new role taken on by foreclosure in Lacan’s theorization of the sinthome.
As Russel Grigg writes, “What is of particular interest in the discussion of Joyce is that it
presents a new theory, according to which foreclosure is the universal condition of the
symptom.”83 Whereas previously Lacan treats the root of the symptom as a repressed
node in the Symbolic register of the neurotic, stood in for by the metaphorical symptom

81

Harari, 81.
Harari, 7.
83
Grigg, 70.
82

44

that manifests in conscious experience, in Seminar XXIII Lacan reconsiders the root of
the symptom writ large to be foreclosure, thus conceiving this root as beyond the
Symbolic. The sinthome represents a shift in Lacan’s thinking in which the boundary
between psychosis and neurosis has been blurred to the point of non-existence. Lacan
offers the following:
How is it that any of us can help feeling that the words on which we depend are in some
sense imposed upon us? It is precisely in this respect that he who is called ill sometimes
goes further than he who is called a man of sound mind. Rather, the question is why a
normal man, a man said to be normal, doesn’t notice that speech is a parasite, that speech
is a veneer, that speech is a form of cancer that afflicts the human being? How is it that
there are some who go so far as to sense this? It’s quite certain that Joyce affords us a
little inkling of this.84

The “parasite” of speech, the “veneer” of discourse that regulates desire and metes out
enjoyment according to Symbolic law, is an affliction, and one which produces a
psychotic (or prepsychotic85) relationship to language in everyone. The above passage
plays on Lacan’s earlier theorizations of the psychotic experience of speech as
“imposed,” in the sense that language is often experienced in psychosis as an
otherworldly emanation from the Real that has a sort of logic and materiality beyond
ordinary meaning. By the time of Seminar XXIII, Lacan starts to think of this as the
general experience of language, but one that goes unnoticed by those “said to be normal,”
while those “called ill” tend to recognize it for what it is. There is a strong parallel here
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to Nietzsche’s suggestion that the death of God goes unrecognized by the great majority,
especially since he describes the proclaimer and narrator of this event as a “madman.”
When Lacan takes the mechanism of foreclosure as the basis of the ordinary structure of
subjectivity, language itself becomes what one might call a “fundamental symptom,” a
parasitic demand for meaning that harbors a hidden problem of the failure of meaning
that is recognized only by a “mad” few.
The issue of ethical defiance and the generalization of foreclosure are both at play
in Lacan’s move from a three- to a four-register psyche, represented by his work in
Seminar XXIII with the Borromean knot. This topological figure is taken from the image
of the Borromeo family crest, depicting three rings that bind each other together in a
symmetrical triad, and is used by Lacan to represent his theory of the three-register
psyche. When one considers any two of the three rings in this structure, which represent
the registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real, one finds that they are held in
contact with each other only by the third. As such, if any of the three rings in the
structure fail in the sense of being broken or cut then all three come loose from one
another. For Lacan, such an unknotting of the Borromean topology of the registers
represents the precipitation of psychosis in the sense that the registers still produce effects
on language, desire, and identity but lack the coordination necessary for livable
subjectivity. The merging of the theory of the symptom with the mechanism of
foreclosure mentioned above is accompanied in Seminar XXIII by Lacan’s suggestion
that “paranoid psychosis and personality as such do not have any relationship, for the
simple reason that they are one and the same thing. In so far as a subject knots together
as three, the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real, he is supported only by their
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continuity. The imaginary, the symbolic and the real are one and the same consistence,
and it is in this that paranoid psychosis consists.”86 Thus, at this juncture of Lacan’s
thinking, the ordinary arrangement of the psyche as the linking together of the three
registers is recognized as what is “called normal,” the symptomatic and prepsychotic
state of suffering the parasite of language, and the function of the sinthome is to repair
and transfigure this structure.
The prepsychotic structure of the three-register psyche is formulated in SXXIII in
two ways, both as the standing apart of the three rings of the Borromean link as not yet
linked, and alternately as the bleeding together of the three registers as continuous, the
former represented by three unlinked rings and the latter by the figure of the trefoil
knot.87 In both cases Lacan uses the introduction of a fourth element, the sinthome, to
repair the topological problems of the knot in order to represent how the sinthome
intervenes to allow the subject to function in a livable way. These two accounts should
be treated as different attempts to convey the same root insight. In the case of the three
unlinked rings Lacan suggests that “[i]t is not a break between the symbolic, the
imaginary, and the real that defines perversion, it is that they already stand apart in such a
way that a fourth term has to be supposed, which on this occasion is the sinthome.”88 The
“perversion” at play in this description evokes a frequent formulation of Lacan’s, “père version,” a “version-of-the-father” or a “turning-towards-the-father.” As such, the above
passage continues,
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I’m saying that what forms the Borromean link has to be supposed to be tetradic – that
perversion merely means version vers le père, a version towards the father – and that all
in all, the father is a symptom, or a sinthome, as you wish. The ex-sistence of the
symptom is what is [implicated] by the very position that presupposes this enigmatic
bond between the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real.89

All of this amounts to the enshrining of a new tenet of Lacanian analysis: the foreclosure
of the fundamental symptom of language means that it stands apart, or “ex-sists,”90 from
the three registers in such a way that it is capable of knotting them together. Moreover,
by doing so it allows the subject to overcome the pre-psychotic symptom of language and
bring it towards a condition of sinthomatic livability. It is worth noting here that what is
ejected from the Symbolic as foreclosed, on this account, is the NF itself as the “the
signifier of the Other qua locus of the law.” What this implies in Seminar XXIII is that
the “failure of metaphor” Lacan previously associates with psychosis should be
understood as the universal failure of the generative, creative powers of language, the
ossification of metaphorical meaning into the experience of meaning as fixed, and hence
the experience of language as parasitic, imposed, and emanating from some unnameable
Real.
In the case of Joyce, and indeed in the case of anyone else who follows the path of
the sinthome, the overcoming of the symptom of language through the forging of the
sinthome involves the practice of “writing” gestured to above, which Lacan describes in
terms of “art.” At the beginning of Seminar XXIII, Lacan states, “I am hereby announcing
what this year shall be my examination of art. In what way is artifice expressly able to
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target what presents itself in the first instance as a symptom? In what way can art – the
artisanal – foil, as it were, what imposes as a symptom? Namely, truth.”91 The
imposition of symptomatic or prepsychotic language on the individual is overcome by the
work that the artisanal is able to do on truth. The relation of the “art” of the sinthome to
the topology of the Borromean knot and the possibility of writing involves the sense of
the possible and the impossible at work in sublimation, but this is reconceived in Seminar
XXIII as a manipulation of the Real in its connection to the “necessary,” the “impossible,”
and the “contingent,” as I will explain in a moment. “Writing” in this sense is a process
of manipulating the boundary of the Real in its intersection or link with the Symbolic, the
Imaginary, and the symptom / sinthome. As Harari notes, “it thus has nothing to do…
with the imaginary scene that amounts to picking up a pen and writing.”92 Of course, the
effects of the sense of writing at play in the theory of the sinthome do indeed have a direct
bearing on such creative acts, though such practices are not immediately involved the
sense of the writing of the sinthome.
Writing, for Lacan, involves the material side of language he describes as the
“letter.” Lacan says that “[t]he written is in no way in the same register or made of the
same stuff, if you’ll allow me this expression, as the signifier.”93 In this sense, the
manipulation of writing is not a process that produces or trades in ordinary constructions
of meaning; it does not operate with signifiers. Instead, its target is the revelation and
putting into motion of something of the Real, which always lies beyond the structures of
meaning as their limit. Lacan argues, “Writing is of interest to me because I think it was
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through little bits of writing that, historically speaking, we entered the real, that is, that
we stopped imagining. The real is upheld by writing little mathematical letters… writing
must always have something to do with the way that we set the knot down in written
form.”94 This attempt to see beyond our systems of meaning through the manipulation of
the letter, the material substance of language stripped of its “signifiance” or
“signifierness,” is what Lacan takes to be the very practice that makes a Borromean knot
of four elements possible. As such, though this sense of writing stands outside or beyond
everyday discourse, what can be written still bears the traces of these discourses’
structures. Lacan says that “the letter is, radically speaking, an effect of discourse.”95
Thus, “That which is written – what would that be in the end? The conditions of
jouissance.”96 Writing, for Lacan, is therefore a play with the limits of meaning and the
structures of desire they condition.
The capacity of writing to reveal and manipulate such structural conditions of
jouissance is bound up inextricably with its relation to Lacan’s notions of necessity and
possibility. In its simplest form, Lacan provides the following formula: “The necessary . .
. is that which doesn’t stop what? – being written… The necessary is linked to the
impossible, and… ‘doesn’t stop not being written’ is the articulation thereof.”97 In light
of the related details above, the characterization of the necessary as that which doesn’t
stop being written means that the necessary denotes the guaranteed limits of meaning
insofar as they are conditioned by the Other and the reality principle. The impossible, on
the other hand, is that which simply cannot be written; within the logic of the reality

94

Lacan, Seminar XXIII, 54. Emphasis added.
Lacan, Seminar XX, 36.
96
Ibid., 131.
97
Ibid., 59.
95

50

principle there is no way to conceive of the syntax of elements that might demonstrate
such a possibility. Meanwhile, what the letter provides, especially those produced by
psychoanalytic discourse and Lacanian topology, is the chance to write that which has not
been written. Lacan explains: “The phallus – as analysis takes it up as the pivotal or
extreme point of what is enunciated as the cause of desire – analytic experience stops not
writing it. It is in this ‘stops not being written’ that resides the apex of what I have called
contingency.”98 In this way, Lacanian puts the elements produced by psychoanalytic
discourse into play such that the unconscious logical elements of the structure of desire,
as in the case of the phallus, can be conceived at all and represented as operative in the
structures of jouissance and discourse. Psychoanalytic discourse, through its effects on
what can be written, therefore renders contingent or possible that which seems impossible
in other discourses.
The Borromean knot is thus a form of writing for Lacan. It stands at the edge of
his thought and helps him to formalize unforeseen possibilities and impossibilities alike.
As Luke Thurston suggests, the knot is meant to “open new theoretical possibilities and
produce new styles of thinking,” but is also an attempt to “consolidate or verify certain
aspects of the earlier theories” to the effect of “the de-stabilization of those theories and
the introduction of unsettling new perspectives.”99 It is held out from ordinary discourse,
pushed beyond prior limits of thought towards new conceptions rendered possible by the
manipulation or “writing” of the new letters produced by psychoanalytic discourse. In
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the context of Seminar XXIII, then, what are the specific manipulations and insights that
this experimental writing amounts to?
Essentially, Lacan’s topological experiments aim to demonstrate the possibility of
naming the unnamable in a way that both reveals and mobilizes the structures of desire.
What psychoanalytic discourse offers us is “a slight chance of finding out something
about [the economy of jouissance], from time to time, by pathways that are essentially
contingent.”100 Through the play of Borromean link-work and knot-writing,
psychoanalytic discourse is able to gesture towards the hold that discourses have on the
subject and demonstrate that the “truths” by which the subject lives are the result of such
structures of language. Lacan argues, “Once one enters into the register of the true, one
can no longer exit it. In order to relegate the truth to the lowly status it deserves, one
must have entered into analytic discourse. What analytic discourse dislodges puts truth in
its place, but does not shake it up. It is reduced, but indispensable.”101 What
psychoanalytic discourse affords is the opportunity to say the truth about truth while
nonetheless remaining bound to some level of the mobilization of one’s jouissance by
language. In Lacan’s words, “What does it mean to speak the truth about truth… It
means to do what I have effectively done, and nothing more – to track the real, which
consists, which ex-sists, only in the knot.”102 This, of course, must be taken in the
context of his statement that “[t]o say the truth about truth is to say that it’s a lie.”103
Lacan indicates that the lived realities structured by discourse are as dissimulative as they
are manipulative, but also that we are nonetheless as unable to uncouple ourselves from
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the symptomatic effects of discourse completely as we are unable to free ourselves from
language as such. This logic is in agreement with Nietzsche’s suggestion that the
illusions of truth, though they become harmful when their inherent artistry is forgotten,
nonetheless remain necessary. The question, then, is what one might be able to do with
the symptomatic structure of language when the artistry of writing and truth are
recovered.

2.5 The writing of the sinthome and the liberation of desire
The sinthome’s origins lie in the fundamental symptom of language. “Sinthome” is the
original spelling of the word symptom at the time that it was first brought into the French
language from its Greek root.104 What Lacan gains from returning to this archaic form
of the word is, primarily, a strategy to put a well-worn and orthodoxy-laden concept of
his field to new work. Moreover, this new term enables extended word play based on its
altered spelling and pronunciation. In this sense, then, Lacan traces the term “symptom”
back to its origins, and by doing so makes possible a play of meanings that defies and
surpasses those coded into the original signifier, leaving the fixity of its original
signifying structure behind. This shift mirrors the process that the move from the
symptom to the sinthome follows for the analysand in Lacan’s clinical practice. The
problem of the symptom is overcome not by dissolving the symptom, but by coding it
with new meanings that turn it into something freshly productive, by effectively rewriting
it as affirmative and coming to identify with it as essential to a free and creative
experience of desire.
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Lacan speaks in Seminar XXIII of the roots of the sinthome in the fault of the
symptom, and the latter’s relationship to necessity and possibility. He says, “This is the
fault, the sin¸which my sinthome advantageously starts with. In English, sin refers to the
trespass of original sin, hence the necessity of the fact that the fault-line that is always
growing doesn’t stop, unless it should undergo the stop of castration as possible.”105 The
sinthome begins with original sin, the fissure or fault-line in the psyche set off by the fall
from fantasized unity with one’s mother into the necessary state of trying to appease the
Other through the acquisition of language. In a twist on his prior formulations of
possibility and necessity Lacan says, “I said in the past that this possible is what stops
being written… a comma has to be included here. The possible is what stops, comma,
being written. Or rather, what would stop, taking the path of being written.”106 This is a
reference to his previous definition of the contingent (that which stops not being written)
with the new twist that the writing of the possible puts a stop to something else. One can
make sense of this in light of the generalization of foreclosure outlined above. If the
originary foreclosure at the root of the symptom renders the latter as missing from the
possibilities of language, then this root remains impossible in the sense of being
perpetually unwritten. Being written, the root of the symptom would seem to be brought
back into the realm of the possible, thereby stopping the fault-line of the symptom from
growing and plaguing the individual.
Everything in this account hinges upon the particular way the sinthome is to be
written. Lacan’s introductory session of Seminar XXIII addresses Socrates’ famous
refusal to accept an easy way out of his trial, suggesting that Socrates does this in order to
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avoid dividing the city of Athens. As a result of this refusal Socrates becomes singular.
Lacan says, “it has to be said that Socrates is not a man, because he agrees to die so that
the city will live on… anything, but not that. This was precisely Socrates’ position. The
but not that is what, under this year’s title, I’m introducing as the sinthome.”107 Given
that Lacan also announces the sinthome as a form of art, both art and the defiant stance of
“but not that” must be seen as two sides of a single idea. Harari suggests that the
becoming-singular of Socrates through the ethical act of refusal hinges upon the
difference between singularity and particularity.108 In this sense, the ethical stance of
refusal entailed by the sinthome should be read as the refusal to remain merely a
particular instantiation of the general structures of meaning and jouissance in favour of
achieving an arrangement of jouissance that is wholly unique. Harari describes the “but
not that” as “a domain of secrets… a privacy necessarily kept apart from a phallic logic…
a confrontation with demand… a reaction, the beginning of an escape from the subjection
to the neurotic symptom – regarding which the sinthome, in its singularity, would entail a
break from these subjective positions.”109 In Lacan’s terms, this refusal is the inception
of a form of heresy in the face of the demands of the Other. He says, “it’s a fact that
Joyce makes a choice, and in this regard he is, like me, a heretic. For haeresis [originally
meaning choice], is precisely what specifies the heretic. One has to choose the path by
which to capture the truth.”110
If the choice to say “anything, but not that” to the general structure of jouissance
demanded by the Other is a heretical act that sets off the beginning of an escape from the
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parasitic symptomatology of language, then the inscription of a new arrangement of
jouissance through the artisanal know-how of writing is what carries this event through to
the realization of the sinthome. This process of writing does not take place in a strictly
rational fashion; phallic rationality, representing the systems of meaning coded in the
Other, is overtaken in this process by savoir-faire, a know-how that finds its roots in the
secrecy of the “but not that.” As Lacan claims, “Joyce didn’t know that he was
fashioning the sinthome… He was oblivious to it and it is by dint of this fact that he is a
pure artificer, a man of savoir-faire, which is what is likewise known as an artist.”111
What is instead involved in the craftsmanship of this know-how is emphasized by Harari
to center upon “knowing oneself to be the cause or origin of a thing,” to be a thing’s
author: “An author is thus someone who causes something, but at the same time someone
skilled in obtaining what he desires. This implies a certain acceptance of one’s own
desire, such that the subject becomes… a heretic, one who chooses.”112
Becoming the author of one’s sinthome and desire mobilizes savoir-faire, and, for
Lacan, this indicates a level of responsibility: “One is only responsible within the limits
of one’s savoir-faire. What is savoir-faire? It is art, artifice, that which endues a
remarkable quality to the art of which one is capable, because there is no Other of the
Other to perform the Last Judgment. At least, so say I.”113 By “Other of the Other”
Lacan means the function of God in language discussed in my previous chapter, in the
sense that the symptomatic character of language leads the subject to experience meaning
as fixed by an assumed divine authority. This Other of the Other could only be God,
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who, because he is dead, leaves the sinthomatic individual the responsibility of judging
the value and validity of the configurations of desire and meaning they write.
Additionally, with the awakening of sinthomatic savoir-faire one finds oneself
responsible, in the sense of being capable of responding defiantly when faced with the
demands of the Other.114 Such know-how, as Harari points out, “does not involve
learning a skill, but sorting something out, getting rid of a burden or irritation. It thus
implies an unknotting or denouement.”115
In rewriting one’s relation to language through the forging of the sinthome, one
rewrites one’s language itself in a significant sense: “the tongue that one does effectively
speak… one creates this tongue.”116 This is supported by Lacan’s crucial belief that
“there is no collective unconscious… only particular unconsciouses to the extent that
every single one of us, from one instant to the next, gives a little nudge to the tongue we
speak.”117 Indeed, if it is within the know-how of the individual to bring the symptom of
language to the level of the sinthome, this same know-how supports the production of
new meanings in an everyday sense. The significance of the sinthome is the capacity it
has to foreclose meanings that one finds repressive or binding, and to make up for their
lack through the production of new meanings. Harari suggests that “by foreclosing
meaning that is congealed or frozen, I am able to engender new, unprecedented
meanings.”118 All of this comes back to the relationship that the individual has to the
Name-of-the-Father. Lacan offers the following: “The hypothesis of the unconscious…
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is something that can only hold up by presupposing the Name-of-the-Father.
Presupposing the Name-of-the-Father, which is certainly God, is how psychoanalysis,
when it succeeds, proves that the Name-of-the-Father can just as well be bypassed. One
can just as well bypass it, on the condition that one make use of it.”119 If the Name-ofthe-father is bypassed as foreclosed, then how can one make use of it? One makes up for
it by putting its position in the psyche to use through the act of naming.
Naming, or nomination, is the creative act of constructing signifiers anew, or of
rewriting existing ones such that their meaning has been significantly reworked, as in
Lacan’s writing of the Real and his transition from the symptom to the sinthome. Insofar
as the Symbolic father is the father of the name, the force at play in the unconscious in
the introduction of the originary signifier of the NF, all of the other signifiers in language
gesture, in a sense, to this original signifier and the organization of desire that it
engenders. This is what is at play in the père-version of the generalized prepsychotic/
symptomatic psyche. By taking up the power of sinthomatic consciousness as a knowhow and a right to challenge this order, the making (or unmaking) of meaning in the play
of language falls to each individual subject. Harari characterizes the act of naming as
“suppletion,” a translation of the French “suppléance” that appears throughout Seminar
XXIII, but that is rendered in the English translation by the phrase “to make up for”:
“Suppletion does not consist of a replacement, but the addition of something new… it is
possible to give language a little nudge on condition that one dispenses, for instance, with
strict syntax, precise vocabulary, dictionary definitions, and in particular the foreclosure
of puns… This moving away from the imperious rules of language… is the origin of the
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phenomenon of suppletion.”120 In this sense, suppletion is the act of writing over the
position of the NF with new rules regarding the limits of meaning, new signifiers that
engender unique organizations of the relationship of jouissance to language. Or, as
Thurston notes, “Joyce’s writing effects a suppletion, makes up for the failure of the knot
to cohere, by reconstituting the knot as well as the place it allows the subject.”121
Thus, Joyce’s creative ability to step beyond the stability of meaning involves a
process in which he rewrites the significance of his relationship to the Symbolic father of
language, and he does so by writing a proper name for himself, a new ego. As Harari
argues, “making a proper name for oneself involves an artifice of pure, mental jouissance
and a belief in being. There is One, a singular beyond any context; a sinthomatic
identification with the ‘Old artificer’ whom we read about in the closing lines of A
Portrait.”122 Joyce’s fundamental suppletive nomination was, in fact, the rewriting of the
signifier Joyce, the name shared between the father who was unable to secure him in an
ordinary organization of jouissance and the figure he himself wanted to become in the
world of letters. The closing lines of A Portrait read: “Welcome, O life! I go to
encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my
soul the uncreated conscience of my race… Old father, old artificer, stand me now and
ever in good stead.”123 Of this passage, Lacan says: “The Portrait… ends with the
uncreated conscience of my race, with respect to which he calls upon the father par
excellence, who would be his father, when in fact this artificer is he. He is the one who
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knows, who knows what he has to do.”124 The identification with the “One,” with the
artificer of the world, is the assumption of the responsibility of creation that is exercised
in the act of nomination, the mainspring of sinthomatic creativity in a world where the
truth of meaning has been wrested away from the grip of all ghostly fathers. For Joyce,
this process takes place through the reconstruction of his name and ego.
The process of being led to the position of the sinthome takes place in the
rewriting of the very knot of the subject’s psyche, such that the sinthome as the fourth
element occupies a unique position that stitches together the disparate elements that were
floating free, or, alternately, provides a true counterpoint to the psychotic continuity of
the three registers of the trefoil. Lacan says that “in one way or another we teach the
analysand to splice, to perform a splice between his sinthome and the parasitic real of
jouissance. This is what typifies our operation.”125 In this splicing, this unknotting and
reknotting, the subject’s relationship to jouissance in language is rewritten. Through this
process the subject, in a sense, “cancels his subscription to the unconscious.”126 This
psychological shift overcomes the demands of the Other to such a degree that even the
demand for meaning has been fundamentally altered; the subject arrives at the point of
knowing the truth about truth and rediscovering the powers of artistry in the domain of
nomination. Meaning becomes a matter of knowing what satisfaction one desires from
the play of discourse and the materiality of language alike and seeking configurations of
language that can realize these desires. The sinthome becomes, rather than a site of
trauma or a symptomatic fault-line, the very motor of a free and affirmative desire. Joyce
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stands as a paragon of this achievement but does not approach the exhaustion of its
possible configurations; the singularity of each sinthome is paramount. As Harari states,
the sinthome is not an attempt to produce clones of Joyce, but rather “an effort to bring
about in the analysand an inventiveness. Or even better: poetry and inventiveness.”127
For Lacan, this theory and the new practice it allows amount to the crowning
achievement of his career as a thinker, the final elaboration of the central impetus of his
project: “How then is the virus of the sinthome transmitted by means of the signifier…
This is what I have attempted to explain throughout the whole course of my seminars.”128
Psychoanalytic discourse renders the force of truth in all other discourses visible, and
opens the possibility of an affirmative and sinthomatic relationship to language in place
of one that is parasitic and symptomatic.

2.6 Conclusion
Lacan’s theory of the sinthome is an attempt to conceive of an artful and creative
relationship to the limits of meaning that is capable of liberating desire by freeing
subjectivity from an oppressive experience of truth. While his earlier clinical approach to
the symptom as a metaphor concerns the subject’s participation in Imaginary fantasies of
identity, just as the traversal of fantasy concerns participation in the Symbolic, the chief
concern of the sinthome is to bring about a change in the subject’s participation in the
Real as the boundary and limit of truth and meaning. This engagement with the Real
consists in “speaking in order to name, rather than naming in order to appease a
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judgmental God,” such that Lacan’s teachings in the period of the sinthome focus on the
subject’s creation of language and organizations of desire as an alternative to being used
by language.129
In this sense, the sinthome is ultimately a theory of how the subject is able to
escape both the phallic function and God, the authoritarian father of language, by
awakening the artistry of nomination. As Harari notes, “Nomination… encapsulates
what we can posit as an alternative… for Freud everything is sustained by the function of
the father; in fact, by precisely an eternal love for the father. By contrast, what Lacan
advances… aims to do without the Name-of-the-Father on condition that it is put to
use.”130 By entering into an artistic relationship with truth and meaning the subject is
able to overcome the pernicious authority of God (the order and fixity of meaning and the
law that meaning be sought out and experienced only as the satisfaction of such an order)
precisely by reclaiming this authority and putting it to use. The study of Joyce and his
“attempt to liquidate the English language, as something self-contained or selfidentical,”131 exemplified most dramatically by the prose of Finnegans Wake, allows
Lacan to theorize this escape from the ordinary laws of language and the structures of
desire they engender. While a suffering subject usually searches for the meaning of their
symptom, thereby “searching for a master,” Joyce “undoes meaning,” and does so
“[w]ithout any hesitation.”132
Lacan postures psychoanalysis as an antidote to religion without much fanfare,
but also without ambiguity: “our analytic appreciation of what is involved in the knot is
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the negative of religion… we no longer believe in the object as such.”133 What the
writing of the knot reveals is that language is coded with a religious logic of being and
truth, while the subject is always unknowingly involved in the construction and efficacy
of truth: “What is a fact? It’s precisely his doing. There is only any fact due to the fact
that the parlêtre says it… There is no fact but by dint of artifice.”134 The liberation from
the grip of the unconscious Other Lacan seeks to bring about is no less than a liberation
from the traces of a tyrannical God in the psyche: “The Other, the Other as the locus of
the truth, is the only place… that we can give to the term ‘divine being,’ God, to call him
by his name… as long as things are said, the God hypothesis will persist.”135 The
arrangements of meaning and desire discourse engenders, which unconsciously indicate
to the subject a higher order and ultimate jouissance of some Other, continually
reproduce a kind of unconscious religious faith in being and identity. Lacan’s attempt to
wrest away the many masks of this Other, to draw back the curtain on language, amounts
to an attempt to exorcise this father through the very writing of God as the Other. In
Lacan’s words, “It seems clear to me that the Other – put forward at the time of ‘The
Instance of the Letter’ as the locus of speech – was a way, I can’t say of laicizing, but of
exorcising the good old God.”136
Crucially though, one must keep in mind that Lacan’s dismissal of a collective
unconscious means that the fundamental symptomatic experience of language, while
universal, is different for each subject. This means that the ghostly father of language has
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a different name for each subject, and, therefore, that the new arrangements of meaning
and desire involved in the forging of a sinthome will always be singular. Joyce’s attempt
to liquidate the English language and his dramatic refusal of almost any stability of
meaning is only one singular example of sinthomatic consciousness. For others, the
transfiguration of language involved in escaping from the fantasy of the ultimate being or
fixity of meaning can just as well allow for the production of “new, unprecedented
meanings” that, while free from any fantasy of perfect self-identity or permanence,
nonetheless pursue a glimmer of being while affirming the inevitability of change.
Indeed, the very act of nomination in the theory of the sinthome entails such change in
the sense that nomination perpetually unknots and reknots the subject’s relationship to
meaning and desire in the pursuit of novel configurations. This perpetual process of the
subject’s self-transfiguration, as my next chapter will show, is strikingly complemented
and exemplified by Nietzsche’s tragic theory of self-overcoming and his nominative
writing of the figure of Dionysus. As Harari writes, “The subject of the symptom… is a
barred or divided subject, one who says: ‘I do not wish to be like this,’ ‘I do not wish to
have that,’ or, indeed, ‘I cannot go on living like this.’ Conversely, one is sure that ‘one
cannot live without’ the sinthome.”137 As I will explore in my next chapter, the perpetual
play of meaning enabled by the sinthomatic writing and rewriting of the limits of
meaning was precisely what Nietzsche could not live without.
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Chapter Three: Nietzsche and the Tragic Artifice of Affirmation
3.1: Introduction
Nietzsche’s thought, as I have argued previously, largely consists of an attempt to
establish a new ground for human values, a new health of desire and creativity capable of
overcoming the problem of nihilism and the death of God. This chapter will articulate
Nietzsche’s approach to this problem while also elucidating the ways his thought can be
taken as a kind of sinthomatic artifice.
As discussed in my first chapter, Nietzsche takes serious issue with the central
philosophical disposition of the Western tradition, what he refers to as “metaphysics,”
due to its reliance on a Platonic conceptualization of being and identity that eschews the
aesthetic character of existence in favour a religious logic of truth as universal, eternal,
and self-identical. This kind of metaphysics, Nietzsche argues, functions as a ubiquitous
logic of human discourse and binds people to false senses of identity that, while useful
and beneficial in certain ways, become increasingly hollow and entrenched over the
course of history. As Themi puts it, “[projecting] imaginary ‘realities’ into nature…
occurs because such imaginaries seem to soothe our fears with pleasing thoughts…
unfortunately, however, such imaginaries are also found to ossify across time and create a
barrier towards desire. This barrier causes what for Nietzsche is expressly the neurosis
or nihilism of a morality that turns against life.”138 The crisis of nihilism that Nietzsche’s
thought so often addresses is, he thinks, the inevitable outcome of this historical legacy of
Platonic-Christian metaphysics; the values and ideals that metaphysics both enable and
demand have lost much of their beneficial character and threaten to become so deeply
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entrenched that all possibility of creation in the domain of values may soon be
irrevocably lost and the reign of the “last man” will become complete. In Nietzsche’s
words, “What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devaluate themselves. The
aim is lacking; ‘why?’ finds no answer.”139 As a thinker, then, Nietzsche seeks not only
to intervene on discourses concerning truth and identity at the level of conceptual
understanding, but also to leverage this intervention to open and mobilize new
experiences of meaning and desire.
Crucially, Nietzsche’s great challenge in this vein is to find a way to loosen the
grip of metaphysical conceptualizations of being without simply falling into a trap of
insurmountable nihilism. Rather than emphasizing any final transience of things,
Nietzsche concerns himself with precisely the “approximation of a world of becoming to
a world of being,”140 the possibility that human artifice is capable of producing for itself a
kind of being, a perduring art that can overcome and colour in the emptiness of things
and function as a ground of value. As Rathbone suggests, “Nietzsche should be
appreciated as always showing in his style what he often says in his content, namely,
that… we must come to see that we are wholes, despite being neither unities nor
totalities.”141 The sense of being that Nietzsche strives after can, I will argue, be
understood in thoroughly sinthomatic terms. Themi offers a suggestion of this sort at the
end of his study of Nietzsche and Lacan, writing that one might “consider from the later
Lacanian perspective whether Nietzsche’s final 1888 affirmation of the natural sciences,
and simultaneously strident rejection of the Christian God, bears something of the
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psychotic’s foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, which could make of Nietzsche’s
writings before he succumbed to madness some kind of sinthome.”142
While I agree with Themi that the thought of the last decade of Nietzsche’s
creative life can be read in sinthomatic terms, my position is that such a reading is best
unfolded through an examination of how Nietzsche’s defining philosophical stance, his
emphasis upon the tragic character of existence, can be shown to unfold sinthomatic
themes and insights at the very heart of his thought. The thesis of this chapter, therefore,
is that Nietzsche’s thought as a whole unfolds a kind of sinthomatic artifice, and I will
establish this reading at three levels of his writings: first, at the level of his theory or
philosophy of linguistic subjectivity, second, at the personal level of his rewriting of the
ancient Greek god Dionysus, and finally at the level his teaching of “self-overcoming” as
a practice of liberating artifice he seeks to make possible for others. Each of these levels
of his thought deeply mirrors and complements Lacan’s conceptualization of the
sinthome as a response to their shared diagnosis of modernity: the civilizational crisis of
creativity in the domain of values.
The texts I focus on in the present chapter are mostly drawn from the last decade
of Nietzsche’s creative life, his “tragic” period of 1881 until his final mental collapse in
early 1889. While such posthumous periodization of a thinker’s life is always arbitrary to
a degree, there are good reasons to focus on these last years of Nietzsche’s creative
output as a period distinct from the rest. First, many of his most central and influential
ideas are either coined or properly elaborated for the first time in this period. These
include his notions of the will to power, the overman, and the doctrine of the eternal

142

Themi, 133-134.

67

return of the same, all of which will be key parts of my analysis. Second, though
Nietzsche never arrives at anything like a traditionally unified philosophical system,
several of his earlier ideas nonetheless find a renewed and invigorated purpose through a
kind of integration they achieve with the whole of his thought in this period.
Chief among the examples that might be offered in this vein is Nietzsche’s
treatment of Dionysus. In his 1872 book The Birth of Tragedy (BT), Nietzsche
investigates the artifice of ancient Greek tragedy to the effect of identifying two
contrasting tendencies in this art, the Apolline and the Dionysian. In this context, he
suggests, the god Apollo represents the light of clarity, individuation, and identity, and
therefore the very capacity and power of artistic image-crafting. In opposition to this
tendency, the god Dionysus manifests in tragedy as the chaos and darkness of unbridled
passion that exists behind the Apolline veil of identity, at once generative and destructive.
These two forces, then, bear significant similarity to the general schema of the divided
subject in psychoanalysis, with the Apolline standing as the necessary Imaginary
experience of ego and identity and the Dionysian representing the ever-present threat of
the irruption of an unconscious Real. After BT Dionysus falls mostly into the
background of Nietzsche’s thought until he reappears as a central figure in The Gay
Science in 1882, after which he remains a central motif until (and even after) the final
days of Nietzsche’s sanity. In this period, though, as I will discuss in detail in section
3.3, Dionysus paradoxically embodies both the tragedy of becoming and the hope of a
new sense of being that creative subjectivity enables.
In a similar fashion to this rebirth of Dionysus, the idea of self-overcoming is
nascent in Nietzsche’s early thought but comes into its fullness only as a tragic thought
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and practice. One of Nietzsche’s early pamphlet-style “Meditations” declares the
following: “your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high
above you, or at least above that which you usually take yourself to be.”143 Here one can
already discern a reconceptualization of identity, of the very being of the subject, as
existing only as an event or trajectory, and indeed a trajectory of elevation, going higher,
or going “over.” Just as with the rebirth of Dionysus, Nietzsche properly elaborates his
teachings of self-overcoming only in his final years, particularly in what is frequently
considered his magnum opus, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Zarathustra).
Zarathustra, published in parts between 1883 and 1885, is a presentation of
Nietzsche’s tragic philosophy in the poetic unity of a quasi-narrative text centered around
the visionary character of Zarathustra. This text’s unified vision of the tragic and the
teachings of self-overcoming will be the ultimate focus of section 3.4. In preparation for
my analysis of Zarathustra I will first examine some of the central ideas of Nietzsche’s
tragic period, which Russel rightly suggests are “irreducibly linked in a conceptual
economy within which there is no possibility of discussing one in the absence of the
others,”144 and then show how these ideas are at work in Nietzsche’s inauguration of
tragic thought in his rewriting of Dionysus in The Gay Science. These key concepts,
namely the will to power and perspectivism, are integral to understanding Zarathustra’s
teachings of self-overcoming as a new artifice of identity, value, and truth, one that aims
at a truly sinthomatic writing of the Real in the Lacanian sense. To begin with, though, it
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is crucial to frame these ideas within a proper understanding of Nietzsche’s theory of
language and reality.

3.2: Creative agency, sublimation, and Nietzsche’s critique of truth
Nietzsche’s relationship to philosophy and truth is at once positive and negative; as much
as he criticizes the conceptual dogma of the Western tradition, he also seeks to unfold a
new positive role for philosophical thought as a transformative domain of creativity. At
the centre of this vision is a theory of language, agency, and creativity that concerns the
human experience and destiny as such. Creativity, for Nietzsche, is the very core of
human existence because creative artifice alone affords desire its mobility, life its
flourishing, truth and being their perdurance, and human life its value, agency, and
freedom. In the words of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, “Only man placed values in things to
preserve himself—he alone created a meaning for things, a human meaning. Therefore
he calls himself ‘man,’ which means: the esteemer. To esteem is to create… without
esteeming the nut of existence would be hollow.”145 Zarathustra also says, “To will
liberates, for to will is to create: thus I teach.”146 For Nietzsche, freedom and agency
themselves are synonymous with a kind of creativity. However, since he considers this
species of creativity to be an achievement, he does not assume agency or even selfhood to
be automatic features of human life. Creative agency and freedom are hard won;
accordingly, they are threatened by many obstacles. Perhaps the most pernicious of these
obstacles is language itself.
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Nietzsche’s central problem with the legacy of “metaphysical” thought, which
might otherwise be called dogmatic philosophy,147 is its ancient and intrinsic bias towards
oversimplifying subtle phenomenal events as reified and static things. The most pertinent
example of this, discussed in my opening chapter, is the very idea of the “I,” the subject,
imagined as a substantial and self-identical totality with a freedom of will that is
somehow causally discrete or self-contained. Nietzsche is also concerned with situations
where such dogmatism has insisted upon clear oppositions or dichotomies where there
are more accurately continuums or “differences of degree,” “especially the ones that
imply a negative value for everything sensitive, temporal or historical, and a positive
value for everything intelligible, supra-sensible, eternal,” such as the relations between
the physiological and the conceptual, instinct and reason, or the unconscious and the
conscious.148 This presents a problem because, for Nietzsche, “Words as signs that
express concepts create a given form for the phenomena, a from that determines the way
things appear to us.”149 To quote a brief aphorism of Nietzsche’s, “Linguistic danger to
spiritual freedom. – Every word is a prejudice.”150
These reifying tendencies in conceptual thought have on the whole produced, for
Nietzsche, two equally dissatisfying models of reality: teleology and mechanistic
materialism. Just as strongly as teleological modes of thought imbue the world with a
fixed religious logic of essences, goods, and ends, a purely materialistic view of things
evacuates the very possibility of value or purpose. In both cases there is no room for
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creative agency, as teleological views of reality take the value, meaning, and order of
things to be eternally fixed, while materialism operates only in terms of cold necessity.
As Christa Davis Acampora notes, “One view makes too much of us – nearly divine and
divorced from the rest of creation – and the other makes too little… neither allows a role
for creativity in the development of organisms and their possible futures.”151 The
question, then, is how Nietzsche’s critique of language and truth stands to offer an
alternative account of creativity capable of overcoming the dogma of being, identity, and
thinghood.
Nietzsche’s theory of perspectivism is a radical epistemological stance that treats
truth as an intensely local, relational, and contextual artifice. As I will show, the
interplay between this perspectival theory of experience and Nietzsche’s understanding of
drives as “wills to power” allows him to articulate new possibilities for the liberation of
desire that complement the sinthome in numerous ways. Alenka Zupančič generally
characterizes Nietzsche’s thought as a kind of anti-philosophy that attempts “to locate the
point of inner limit, or inherent possibility, of a given discourse… and to activate this
precise point as the potential locus of creation.”152 Early on in Nietzsche’s thought he
arrives at the conclusion that the very discourses of the Enlightenment and scientific
inquiry, both stemming from a certain Christian ethic of the goodness of ultimate truth,
arrive at an unintended and self-undermining limit. He is convinced by Friedrich Albert
Lange’s neo-Kantian analysis of reality that “metaphysical materialism is selfundermining in that it itself leads to the conclusion that it can speak only of an apparent
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world… by quite properly showing that the mind constructs its world, science limits its
own competence to the world of appearances.”153 Essentially, Nietzsche accepts the
Kantian dictum that cognition and experience are limited to a purely phenomenal world
while rejecting the idea of any ultimate noumenal reality behind appearance as a mere
metaphysical projection.
The consequence of this stance is that the very surface-world of phenomenal
appearance is reality, the only reality. “The true world—we have abolished. What world
has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also
abolished the apparent one.”154 Nietzsche’s perspectivism is meant, among other things,
to dissolve the very dichotomy between the true and the apparent, the subjective and the
objective. In his words, “The reasons for which ‘this’ world has been characterized as
‘apparent’ are the very reasons which indicate its reality; any other kind of reality is
absolutely indemonstrable.”155 The reasons for characterizing the phenomenal world as
“apparent” Nietzsche is referring to are precisely those for understanding human
cognition as a constructive act, one that supplies identity to the objects of perception. If,
as Nietzsche argues, these affective and conceptual processes are the only things that
allow a reality of objects to cohere at all, this means that the very idea of “objective”
knowledge is misguided; there can be no objective reality that is not ultimately a kind of
artifice. As Lacan puts it, there is no “object as such,” and there are “facts” only by dint
of artifice. In Nietzsche’s own words, “There is only a perspective seeing, only a
perspective ‘knowing’” because ideas like “pure reason” or “knowledge in itself…
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demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no
particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone
seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking.”156 The locus of truth,
then, is not a stable reality independent from human subjectivity, but rather something
internal to it. As Zupančič suggests, “Nietzsche’s bet on appearance is not a bet on
appearance against truth; it is a bet on truth as inherent to appearance… The object is no
longer external to the image or representation (so that the image could be compared to it),
but inherent to it: it is the very relation of, say, a painting to itself… representation
represents that which is created in the very act of representation.”157 As such, Nietzsche
believes that the interpretive artifice of human experience is fundamentally creative,
subjective, and aesthetic in character, but just as much as this view proto-deconstructs
illusions of ultimate permanence or objectivity it also suggests that any “approximation
of a world of becoming to one of being” consists precisely in the creative artifice of
interpretation.
So, what are the “active interpreting forces” at play in this perspectival account of
reality? Crucially, these forces do not belong to, nor stand at the disposal of, the ego.
Since Nietzsche views the egoic sense of self as itself an interpretation, the egoic subject
cannot be postulated as the force or structure that enacts interpretation. As Russel puts it,
interpretation is not to be conceived as the activity of an underlying subject… to figure
interpretation in this way is itself an interpretation, one guided by a metaphysical project
that opposes the subjective and the objective… Interpretation is not the activity of a
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subject discerning underlying meaning, but the pre-subjective projection of a multiplicity
of meanings or possibilities that constitute the world’s phenomenal surface.158

Perspectivism thereby forbids taking the egoic subject as the agent of interpretation
because such subjectivity is merely a perspectival effect of an interpretive force (or
complex of forces) that precedes it. It is on this point that the ideas of perspectivism and
the will to power are inextricably connected.
The theory of “the will to power” represents Nietzsche’s attempt to arrive at a
maximally economical conception of the psyche, as it describes human psychology in
terms of a single mechanism: within what is ordinarily treated as a substantial totality, the
“self,” there exists a multiplicity of structures engaged in constantly shifting struggles for
power. Contrary to the traditional conception of the egoic self as the agent of thought
and action, there exists beneath each fiction of identity, as Nietzsche’s notebooks suggest,
“the mutual struggle of that which becomes, often with the absorption of one’s opponent;
the number of becoming elements not constant.”159 This multiplicity of competing forces
is related to the psychoanalytic theory of “drives,” a term often deployed by Nietzsche,160
insofar as each of these forces gives rise to a kind of end or goal and vies for expression.
Simply put, the will to power is the character of struggle in the event of human life,
drives are the centres of force in this struggle, and interpretation or perspective is the
emergent result of this competition of drives.161 As Patrick Wotling argues, “the language
of the drives is fundamentally fixation of superior and inferior functions within the body,
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within a living organism… an infra-conscious language, i.e. a language which does not
translate into words… but ultimately renders them possible.”162
The notions of drive and the will to power are relevant to the perspectival account
of creative artifice because Nietzsche believes that, for most people, the drives and the
perspectives they give rise to are most often in a state of utter anarchy. One finds in this
aspect of Nietzsche’s thought the parallel of an inconsistent Other, the population of the
conscious and unconscious mind with inherited and contradictory goals and desires that
tear the psyche in different directions. For any robust species of creativity or agency to
emerge from this state of confusion there must be a radical reorganization of the psyche
around an ascendant central drive and desire; agency and creativity must be achieved
through a mechanism of sublimation.
Nietzsche’s understanding of drives and sublimation significantly anticipates key
aspects of psychoanalytic theory; some even argue that it surpasses the clarity of such
psychoanalytic conceptions.163 The key problem of any theory of sublimation is how to
differentiate between a desirable process of sublimation on the one hand and a
pathological symptom formation on the other, since both involve the channeling of a
drive or desire through some kind of transformative expression. As I demonstrated in my
previous chapter, Lacan’s theory of the sinthome embraces the symptom as a potentially
liberating engine of desire so long as it is rewritten as something that makes life livable,
transfigured into a locus of creativity and agency. Sublimation plays a remarkably
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similar role for Nietzsche, as Ken Gemes argues, in the sense that “sublimations involve
integration or unification, while pathological symptoms involve splitting off or
disintegration… What is disintegrated is of course the (possibility of a) unified self.”164
On Nietzsche’s view, one of the characteristic features of modernity is the very
disorderliness of the environment of values, perspectives, and goals that one internalizes
in the course of socialization. This is both a blessing and a curse in the sense that this
cultural chaos harbours great creative potential while also dooming most people to an
insurmountable inner struggle:
In times like these, abandonment to one’s instincts is one calamity more. Our instincts
contradict, disturb, destroy each other… Rationality in education would require that
under iron pressure at least one of these instinct systems be paralyzed to permit another to
gain in power, to become strong, to become master. Today the individual still has to be
made possible by being pruned: possible here means whole.165

Sublimation, here described in terms of instinct systems,166 therefore involves the
ascendancy of a drive to a position of power from which it can orchestrate and redirect
other drives, integrating them in the pursuit of a particular desire. Those who achieve
this kind of integration, Gemes contends, “actively collect, intensify, and order some of
those disparate forces, and create a new direction for them, thereby… reorienting, to
some degree, the whole field of forces in which we all exist.”167 All of this amounts to an
escape from the anarchy of instincts through the order granted by the power of a drive, or
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perhaps a desire, that becomes master over all others and thereby becomes the necessary
centre of one’s life. This is indeed a recipe for enhancing of the livability of life, but, as
Nietzsche says, also a recipe for the very becoming “whole” or “possible” of the
individual, the forging of a singular organization and individuality. As Gemes suggests,
“having free will [for Nietzsche] is not a matter of being free of necessity, but rather
acting from a kind of inner necessity stemming from this centre of gravity [of an
ascendant drive].”168 Just as with Lacan’s sinthome, there is a positive estimation of
necessity at the heart Nietzsche’s theory of sublimation.
The issue of necessity in Nietzsche’s theory of sublimation is connected to yet
another characteristic of the sinthome: that of the artificer’s (lack of) self-knowledge.
Nietzsche says that “[t]o have to fight the instincts—that is the formula of decadence: as
long as life is ascending, happiness equals instinct.”169 “Decadence” here refers to the
contemporary anarchy of instincts mentioned above, in the sense of an inconsistent Other
that produces neurotic turmoil. As I have shown, Nietzsche insists that the power that
overcomes such turmoil cannot be the iron rule of a rational ego, while, crucially, he
further insists that this power must be kept apart from the logic of the ego at all costs. He
claims, “We deny that anything can be done perfectly as long as it is still done
consciously,”170 and even that, “To become what one is, one must not have the faintest
notion what one is.”171 The advent of a creative transfiguration of life around a central
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engine of desire, for Nietzsche, just as for Lacan, requires that this desire be kept hidden
from the ego, kept a secret apart from phallic logic. The above passage continues:
nosce te ipsum [know thyself] would be the recipe for ruin… misunderstanding oneself,
making oneself smaller, narrower, mediocre, become reason itself… The whole surface
of consciousness—consciousness is a surface—must be kept clear of all great
imperatives… Meanwhile the organizing ‘idea’ that is destined to rule keeps growing
deep down… it prepares single qualities and fitnesses that will one day prove to be
indispensable as means towards a whole.172

In this passage one finds quite a clear warning against the temptation to pursue rational
self-analysis and the construction of egoic or Imaginary identifications at the expense of
unconscious developments of desire, especially identifications with imperatives, or, one
might say, demands, such as the demands of the Other. Separate from such logic,
separate from any attempt to pin down one’s essence or direction according to the
rationality of the Imaginary under the auspices of the Other, the “single qualities and
fitnesses” that lead one towards a sense of wholeness grow as a secret and singular
artifice.
So, Nietzsche’s perspectivism pertains not only to his critiques of philosophy and
language but also to his whole understanding of creativity and freedom, as well as his
theories of consciousness and self, because it stands as one aspect of a broader theory of
reality that places creative artifice at the centre of existence. Standing on its own,
however, such a theoretical explication of Nietzsche’s views remains inevitably abstract
and, for that reason, somewhat divorced from the real animus of his thought. The sense
of sublimation articulated above is closely aligned with certain aspects of Lacan’s schema
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of the sinthome but lacks a proper sense of the creation of the new or with the
manipulation of the Real as such. To see that Nietzsche’s thought does indeed articulate
and accomplish such sinthomatic feats one must examine the passionate and literary
aspects of his writings to fill his theories in with the colour of their poetic moorings. To
begin this task, my next section will examine the tragic character of Nietzsche’s thought
and his sinthomatic writing of the figure of Dionysus, the tragic icon par excellence.

3.3 The spirit of tragedy: Nietzsche’s writing of Dionysus
Nietzsche’s writings articulate many theoretical and philosophical insights into human
existence as an inherently creative event, one of perspectival artifice, but they also
communicate a record of his personal experience of these insights and reveal the
admixture of joy and pain they brought him; to wit, in Nietzsche’s texts one finds certain
traces of his jouissance. This aspect of his writings is important to consider because,
perhaps more than anything besides his eventual madness, it clarifies the stakes of
moving beyond the stability of a traditional sense of self and life. Moreover, the more
personal and emotionally charged centres of Nietzsche’s thought are frequently those
where his own creative artifice of truth are most keenly displayed. To this end, an
analysis of Nietzsche’s relationship to the figure of Dionysus is illustrative, as his
treatment of this god crystallizes a breadth of issues, including the failure of religious or
metaphysical senses of value and purpose, the utter ephemerality of existence, and the
hope for the creation of new values beyond nihilism. Moreover, the integration of so
many of Nietzsche’s concerns and insights into the site of a single name, a name he even
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tried in desperation to adopt as his mind began to disintegrate,173 indicates the possibility
of taking “Dionysus” as a site of a kind of sinthomatic writing in Nietzsche’s life. The
spirit, the jouissance, that blazes in Nietzsche’s writing of this name is the painful joy of
tragic affirmation.
In a new preface to Human, All Too Human that he writes in 1886, Nietzsche
reflects back on the circumstances of his writing of Truth and Lie, saying, “I was, so far
as my own development was concerned, already deep in the midst of moral skepticism
and destructive analysis, that is to say in the critique and likewise the intensifying of
pessimism as understood hitherto.”174 What is of interest in this retrospective account is
the suggested equivalence between moral skepticism and “destructive” analysis on the
one hand, and a critique and intensifying of pessimism on the other. Nietzsche’s
philosophical elaboration of the tragic can be defined in precisely such terms – a critique
of pessimism that radicalizes and intensifies its object of critique. Just as Zupančič
argues that Nietzsche mobilizes the inner limit of the discourse of philosophy as a site of
creative generation, Nietzsche precipitates the implosion of nihilistic morality precisely at
the limit or breaking point of its pessimism.
For Nietzsche, the two-sided recognition of the reality of change and the
impossibility of eternal being is itself the essence of the tragic: the flow of becoming,
change, and passing away is real, while any sense of being or perdurance belongs only to
human artifice. It is the turn towards this difficult view of life with focus and a spirit of
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affirmation that marks the dawn of the tragic period of Nietzsche’s thought, which begins
in 1882 with the publication of The Gay Science. In an earlier text, Nietzsche suggests
that “tragedies have to do precisely with what is incurable, ineluctable, inescapable in the
fate and character of man.”175 What is inescapably tragic about the fate of the human
situation is its utter ephemerality; eventual dissolution and loss are guaranteed at every
scale of life and history. There is no one “true world,” no single higher and permanent
order of reality to uncover. Nietzsche’s “destructive analysis,” as the next section of this
chapter will show, eventually leads him to a new joy and a new laughter, but these must
be understood as issuing from his critique and intensification of pessimism itself, the
latter taken as a kind of subjective unknotting that necessarily precedes a more potent
artifice to come.
Nietzsche’s critique of pessimism closely examines the effects, structures, and
psychological motivations of pessimistic interpretations of life. In GS he frames this
critique by distinguishing between two paradigmatic kinds of sufferers. The first, he
says, “suffer from an impoverishment of life and seek quiet, stillness, calm seas,
redemption from themselves through art and insight, or else intoxication, paroxysm,
numbness, madness.”176 This type of sufferer therefore has the character of turning away
from suffering, as their suffering is not openly livable. Nietzsche names “romanticism”
as the kind of pessimism that answers to the suffering that seeks refuge from itself,
writing, “All romanticism in art and in knowledge fits the dual needs of [this] type.”177
He goes on to say that the type of sufferer who seeks out the salves of romanticism needs
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“mainly mildness, peacefulness, goodness in thought and in deed… as well as logic, the
conceptual comprehensibility of existence – for logic soothes, gives confidence – in
short, a certain warm, fear-repelling narrowness and confinement to optimistic
horizons.”178 As I will elaborate, one could say that this romantic mode of suffering
remains firmly wedded to the regulation of Symbolic law, as it seeks sanctioned
identifications and excitations as a means to hide from the danger of unmediated
jouissance.
In dramatic contrast, the second type of sufferer in Nietzsche’s account suffers
from “a superabundance of life” and seeks “Dionysian art as well as a tragic outlook and
insight into life… the Dionysian god and man… can allow himself not only the sight of
what is terrible and questionable but also the terrible deed and every luxury of
destruction, decomposition, negation; in his case, what is evil, non-sensical, and ugly
almost seems acceptable because of an overflow in procreating, fertilizing forces capable
of turning every desert into bountiful farmland.”179 Nietzsche’s alternative to romantic
pessimism, his “pessimism of the future,” is therefore a Dionysian pessimism defined by
its character of turning towards life in all of its suffering and ephemerality because it
experiences destruction and suffering as part and parcel of generative change.180 For this
reason, one might say that the Dionysian pessimist possesses a defining courage to
embrace the dangers of jouissance beyond mediation of the Other. In contrast to the
pacifying metaphysical illusions required by sufferers who turn away from life, the
Dionysian pessimist turns towards the problem of ephemerality and embraces the
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impossibility of eternal truth and being. In The Antichrist Nietzsche comments on the
disposition a reader must have to understand his work, and the passage summarizes this
tragic relationship to truth well: “One must have become indifferent; one must never ask
if the truth is useful or if it may prove our undoing. The predilection of strength for
questions for which no one today has the courage; the courage of the forbidden; the
predestination to the labyrinth.”181 In this sense, then, Nietzsche still characterizes a
Dionysian attitude towards life as a pursuit of truth, but in the sense that this pursuit is
precisely the unraveling of metaphysical fictions and an indifference towards the dangers
of the perspectival labyrinth.
This passage in GS is in many ways the inauguration of Nietzsche’s tragic period,
marking a re-consecration of Dionysus as the central emblem of tragic wisdom after a
decade of near absence from Nietzsche’s writings. Walter Kaufmann offers a useful
interpretation of this rebirth of tragedy:
Looking for a pre-Christian, Greek symbol that he might oppose to “the Crucified,”
Nietzsche found Dionysus. His “Dionysus” is neither the god of the ancient Dionysian
festivals nor the god Nietzsche had played off against Apollo in The Birth of Tragedy,
although he does, of course, bear some of the features of both. In the later works of
Nietzsche, “Dionysus” is no longer the spirit of unrestrained passion, but the symbol of
the affirmation of life with all its suffering and terror.182

Dionysus functions as a symbol of tragic affirmation because Nietzsche shifts his focus
away from the role of Dionysus as the god of wine and intoxication and towards the myth
of Dionysus: the cycle of Dionysus eternally torn to pieces by the titans and eternally
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reborn. The issue at stake in this, in Nietzsche’s words, is that of “the meaning of
suffering: whether a Christian meaning or a tragic meaning.”183 Nietzsche takes
Christianity to be romantic in the sense that it turns away from suffering in its pursuit of
the antidote of eternal salvation, and suggests that this interpretation takes the meaning of
suffering to be “the path to a holy existence”184 in an afterlife beyond. As such, “The
God on the cross is a curse on life, a signpost to seek redemption from it.”185 Opposed to
this, “Dionysus cut to pieces is a promise of life: it will be eternally reborn and return
again from destruction.”186 In this way, Dionysus is a symbol of becoming that involves
destruction and generation in equal measure. Moreover, one can only truly affirm the
tragic suffering inherent in reality’s cycles of dissolution and generation if “existence is
considered sacred enough to justify even a tremendous amount of suffering.”187
It is this tension, this collision, between Dionysus’s promise and the curse of The
Crucified that crystallizes so much of Nietzsche’s thought and suggests a kind of writing
of the Real in sinthomatic terms. Zupančič suggests that Nietzsche himself is the edge,
the border, between Dionysus and The Crucified, a kind of fault-line of the Real between
them: “I am two, I am a split, I am the event, Nietzsche keeps repeating—‘Dionysus and
the Crucified,’ at the same time, as the edge between the two… Until [Nietzsche], there
was Dionysus and there was the Crucified… this is what Nietzsche considers to be his
achievement… [that] they emerge as two, as a doubleness, only from within this very
break.”188 In Zupančič’s reading, Nietzsche’s central philosophical innovation is the
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recognition of a transformative kind of consciousness embodied by the image of the noon
or midday, one of his most frequent motifs. In Nietzsche’s figure of the high noon,
where things are “dressed in their own shadows,”189 Zupančič reads a subjectivity akin to
psychoanalytic discourse (which Lacan believes one briefly enters whenever one moves
between discourses) but described in terms of a shift between perspectives. She writes,
“there is a perspective (on things) that emerges only when one shifts perspectives. It does
not exist as a separate perspective with its own point of view; yet it is a perspective.”190
This perspective, she argues, centres around “the middle, inner edge of life, the point
where life is decided,”191 in the sense that “the Real exists as the internal fracture or split
of representation, as its intrinsic edge on account of which representation never fully
coincides, not simply with its object, but with itself.”192
This reading suggests that Nietzsche’s supreme creative act is to inscribe himself
as a kind of border of noncoincidence between Dionysus and Christ, to bring these two
gods together as nearly-mirrored divinities in the throes of death and to inhabit the edge
between them as a site where the Real of value is decided. Though Zupančič never once
mentions the sinthome in her text, the description she offers of Nietzsche as the
generative edge between Dionysus and Christ, “the point where they can only just be
perceived as two that are distinguished-yet-indistinguishable,”193 strikingly articulates an
act of sinthomatic suppletion in ways that are perhaps even clearer than Lacan’s
discussion of Joyce. In Zupančič’s words, “Dionysus does not come after the Crucified,
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as something completely different. Dionysus is not simply the equivalent of new,
different values; Dionysus is not… the morning of a new epoch after the fall of the old
one. Dionysus is the beginning as midday, the moment when ‘one turns to two,’ namely,
the moment of the very split or ‘becoming two’ as that which is new.”194 This is to say
that Dionysus does not come to replace The Crucified; Christ is not disavowed, ejected,
or repressed. Rather, the very site of “The Crucified” is suppleted by the writing of
“Dionysus” as its imperfect mirror. Put differently, this suppletion takes place through
Nietzsche’s assumption of a subjectivity between the suffering of Christ and Dionysus.
Taken in this way, Nietzsche’s relationship to Dionysus communicates his
experience of a reality internally fractured by a creative manipulation of the Real and
thereby opened to the possibility of new values. It may be too much to go so far as
calling Dionysus Nietzsche’s sinthome, but at the very least Nietzsche’s Dionysus stands
as an example of the “poetry and inventiveness” characteristic of sinthomatic writing.
The god eternally cut to pieces as “a promise of life,” at once incommensurable with and
nearly identical to the god on the cross as a promise of eternal life, embodies in a single
word and image the very structure of perspectival consciousness. Existence itself, being
itself, eternally returns as Dionysus does; he is not nothing, we are not nothing, and yet
disintegration and ephemerality belong to the heart of existence; Dionysus is torn to
pieces, all artifice is inevitably sundered, and yet an eternal glimmer of generation,
regeneration, and perdurance belongs to the artifice of which we are capable. Nietzsche’s
youthful despair over the collapse of his Christian faith is redeemed in an artifice that
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exists as the edge between two names, that simultaneously finds and declares truth to be
immanent to its own enunciation.
However, just as Lacan or Harari might speak of an unknotting that precipitates a
stronger knotting, for Nietzsche one must always go under in order to “go over,” to go
higher and to become what one is: “I break of my word: thus my eternal lot wants it; as a
proclaimer I perish.”195 As Zupančič writes, “To perish as a proclaimer, to break at one’s
word, is to become the thing one proclaims… This is not to say, however, that in order to
become something else, one first has to break. The break itself is the ‘something else,’…
The something else is the One becoming Two.”196 Dionysus is the central emblem of
Nietzsche’s personal path of going-under and going-over, but to understand the teaching
Dionysus represents, that he is a signifier by which something of the virus of the
sinthome is transmitted, one must understand the more general sense of self-overcoming
he represents. For this, I will now turn to Nietzsche’s Zarathustra.

3.4: Thus Spoke Zarathustra: The tragic art of self-overcoming
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, by far the most literary of Nietzsche’s works, communicates the
central insights of Nietzsche’s tragic period in a unified poetic vision and, accordingly,
offers many insights into how Nietzsche’s thought can be taken as a whole. Of particular
interest to any attempt to read Nietzsche in sinthomatic terms is the great number of
passages in Zarathustra concerning the idea of self-overcoming, phrased in terms of
Untergang, “going under,” and Übergang, “going over.” This pair of phrases describes,
for Nietzsche, a kind of tragic cycle of the creative spirit as necessarily passing through
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states of depletion, disintegration, or sundering on the way towards new heights of health
and integration. This account of the creative development of the individual, then, has at
its heart the wisdom of the tragic spirit of Dionysus turned inwards: even within a single
human life one can be cut to pieces and reborn, and if a life is to be lived creatively then
this process is absolutely necessary. In addition to capturing the spirit of Dionysus, the
description of self-overcoming in Zarathustra also incorporates the image of the high
noon, as the sun needs to go under – under the sea, under the earth – in order to go over
and once again reach the height of noon, the moment of shortest shadow. This creative
process of disintegration and reintegration, as I will show, corresponds remarkably to a
process of sinthomatic unknotting and reknotting in its insistence upon the overcoming of
inherited values and identifications in favour of the birth of the new. In this section, then,
I will examine Nietzsche’s presentation of self-overcoming in Zarathustra as a teaching
in order to show that his thought is sinthomatic not only at the levels of theory and his
personal creative acts, but also in terms of what he attempts to make possible for others.
The very first aphorism in the main text of Zarathustra, entitled “On the Three
Metamorphoses,” is a microcosm of the entire work’s account of creative selfovercoming. Zarathustra says, “Of three metamorphoses of the spirit I tell you: how the
spirit becomes a camel; and the camel, a lion; and the lion, finally, a child.”197 These
three stages of creative development describe the internalization of values (the beast of
burden accepting the weight of its cargo), the courageous refusal of this burden (the
lion’s “no”), and finally the dawn of a new innocence and creativity (the child’s “yes”).
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Nietzsche’s poetic description of these stages communicates, as I will show, a trajectory
of sinthomatic sublimation.
In the first stage of the creative spirit, Nietzsche describes the camel as “the
strong reverent spirit that would bear much.”198 This image suggests the acceptance and
internalization of values and morals, both passive and active, that accompany the early
stages of life. There are clear parallels here to the inauguration of subjectivity and
acceptance of the burdensome demands of the Other as the necessary first stage of a
creative life. Following this logic, “the spirit becomes a lion who would conquer his
freedom and be master in his own desert… for ultimate victory he wants to fight with the
great dragon… ‘Thou shalt.’”199 The great dragon “Thou shalt” represents the
fundamental obstacle of creativity: the self-evident and totalizing completeness of value
in a given reality principle. The dragon speaks, and says, “All value has long been
created, and I am all created value. Verily, there shall be no more ‘I will.’”200 Crucially,
the image of the lion represents an act of heresy, a “no,” a declaration of “anything, but
not that” directed towards the tyranny of values that declare themselves to be
invulnerably final.
In another work, Nietzsche offers a parallel description of such awakening of a
creative spirit, writing, “a will and desire awakens to go off, anywhere, at any cost…
‘Better to die than to go on living here.’”201 Issuing from this act of heresy is “the
creation of freedom for oneself for new creation… To assume the right to new values—
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that is the most terrifying assumption for a reverent spirit that would bear much.”202 Here
there is a sense of the danger and the horror of stepping beyond the defined boundaries of
value and the regulation of experience they afford, but also the promise of liberation
contained in this first step beyond the regulated and familiar. Finally, though, even this
heretical resistance must be overcome and developed into a creative subjectivity that
leaves this drama behind: “Why must the preying lion still become a child? The child is
innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first
movement, a sacred ‘Yes.’ For the game of creation… a sacred ‘Yes’ is needed: the
spirit now wills his own will.”203
These metamorphoses of the spirit describe a path of self-overcoming at the
timescale of a whole human life, but this description is counterbalanced in Zarathustra by
others that much more strongly suggest creative self-transformation to occur as a
perpetual cycle of sundering and transfiguration, unknotting and reknotting. This aspect
of self-overcoming is centrally important to Nietzsche’s account because it is only in the
sense of a joyous affirmation of the glimmer of being in the ephemeral, the perpetual
transfiguration of experience through the unknotting and reknotting of identity and being,
that self-overcoming can be properly understood as a tragic or Dionysian teaching.
Nietzsche writes,
Creation—that is the great redemption from suffering, and life’s growing light. But that
the creator may be, suffering is needed and much change. Indeed, there must be much
bitter dying in your life, you creators… through a hundred souls I have already passed on
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my way, and through a hundred cradles and birth pangs. Many a farewell I have taken…
this very destiny—my will wills.204

In passages such as this, Nietzsche emphasizes that the very destiny of a creative life – a
life that turns towards the perspectival and towards experiencing itself as tragic artifice,
as the lived event of the creative artifice of truth – is to experience oneself not as
overcome, but as overcoming, as creative travail without finality. As Zarathustra says,
“You will be a heretic to yourself… You must wish to consume yourself in your own
flame: how could you wish to become new unless you had first become ashes!”205 Such a
perpetual character of self-overcoming betrays a jouissance that exists only beyond
identity, beyond the maintenance of desire around a cherished set of ideal identifications,
and points instead towards the tragic affirmation of desire as mobile, transformative, and
creative.
The character of self-overcoming as an iterative and tragic process is crucial to
understanding two of its most infamous and misunderstood expressions: the Übermensch
and the doctrine of the eternal return. To begin with, one must recall that Nietzsche’s
conception of the Übermensch or “overman” is an ideal that aims to capture the spirit of
tragic creativity as something that points beyond the scope of an individual human life; it
suggests that the artifice of creativity is not merely a means of personal escape from a
tyrannical reality but also the means by which societies and civilizations might overcome
themselves. This aspect of Nietzsche’s thought reaches towards a futural range and
orientation of creativity that is perhaps wanting in Lacan’s account, and it is presented
with unequivocal importance: “God died: now we want the overman to live… I have the
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overman at heart, that is my first and only concern—and not man: not the neighbour, not
the poorest, not the most ailing, not the best… what I love in man is that he is an overture
and a going under… That you despise… that lets me hope… That you have despaired, in
that there is much to revere. For you did not learn how to surrender.”206 The term
Übermensch in its most literal translation might be rendered as “overhuman,” in the sense
that it represents the goal of surpassing the interpretations and identifications of what has
hitherto been considered the human as such. At the beginning of the text, Zarathustra
declares that “[m]an is something that shall be overcome,” that “[m]an is a rope, tied
between beast and overman—a rope over an abyss. A dangerous across, a dangerous onthe-way…”207 This suggests that the task of self-overcoming as the affirmation of the
tragic and the perspectival should not come to a kind of solipsistic end with each creative
individual, but be borne forwards as a collective transfiguration of reality. Taken in this
way, the overman represents the projection of an apotheosis of tragic affirmation to come
that would give birth to a tragic culture. As Kaufmann puts it, “The man… who has
organized the chaos of his passions and integrated every feature of his character,
redeeming even the ugly by giving it meaning in a beautiful totality—this Übermensch
would also realize how inextricably his own being was involved in the totality of the
cosmos: and in affirming his own being, he would also affirm all that is, has been, or will
be.”208 In order to understand the psychology that the overman represents as an ideal,
one must understand the defining thought that such an overhuman would be capable of
thinking: the eternal return.
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The doctrine of the eternal return of the same, by Nietzsche’s own estimation, is
the very centrepiece of his thought. He describes his return to tragic thought in the
following manner: “herewith I again touch the point from which I once went forth: The
Birth of Tragedy was my first revaluation of all values. Herewith I again stand on the soil
out of which my intention, my ability grows—I, the last disciple of the philosopher
Dionysus—I, the teacher of the eternal recurrence.”209 This idea is so central to
Nietzsche’s writings because, as a creative myth, it most clearly communicates the sense
of being he seeks within a world of flux and becoming. To return to the leading phrase of
the introduction to this chapter, Nietzsche’s full formulation is: “That everything recurs is
the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being:—high point of the
meditation.”210 The height of a sense of being, then, is to be sought in a thinking of
recurrence: how can this be understood?
The thought of the eternal return of the same is not, as it is sometimes mistaken to
be, a physical or metaphysical theory that the history of the universe and the earth within
it infinitely repeats an identical cycle of events. It is instead the mythopoetic
communication of an ideal subjectivity that has perfectly overcome any attachment to the
old metaphysics of being, and thereby left behind all misgivings and vengefulness
towards life itself. In a central passage Nietzsche writes, “To redeem those who lived in
the past and to recreate all ‘it was’ into a ‘thus I willed it’—that alone should I call
redemption… but what is it that puts even the liberator himself in fetters? ‘It was’—that
is the name of the will’s gnashing of teeth and most secret melancholy. Powerless
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against what has been done, he is an angry spectator of all that is past.”211 In this sense,
the final obstacle of creativity is the very problem of affirming ephemeral temporality
itself; the fundamental symptom of life, for Nietzsche, is the very knowledge of the
necessary passing away of so much good in the past and, moreover, the necessity of
everything terrible in the past as the precedent of anything good in the present or future.
The near impossibility of accepting, on the one hand, the fundamental transience of the
beautiful, and on the other the history of suffering as the necessary path that led towards
the present, is what Nietzsche takes to have been the original motivation of metaphysical
thought as a kind of compensatory revenge against time and ephemerality: “This, indeed
this alone, is what revenge is: the will’s ill will against time and its ‘it was’…
‘Everything passes away; therefore everything deserves to pass away. And this too is
justice, this law of time that it must devour its children.’ Thus preached madness.”212
Just as Lacan asserts that the fundamental symptomatology of life issues from each
individual’s feeling they have been unjustly severed from a proper sense of being,
Nietzsche suggests that the human impetus towards self-torture and destruction arises
from an inability to reckon with the tragic character of existence itself.
To overcome this sense of reality as a symptom, Nietzsche believes that humanity
must strive for a radical and creative affirmation of existence as a whole, reaching back
into the abyss of suffering and accepting that any sense of being in the present or future
can exist only as artifice. This ideal of radical affirmation, almost certainly unattainable
in its perfected form, is what is contained in the thought of the eternal return as a creative
appropriation of the past, a redemptive act of artifice that perfectly embraces the tragic
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character of artifice itself. As a mentor of mine quite eloquently puts it, “The will is
delivered from vengefulness when it wills the eternal return of the same, i.e., when it
wills time and becoming as being rather than nothing, a choice and decision it can make
because being is no longer thought as the timeless permanence of presence. The will
becomes free when it can choose time’s passing, when it can will itself in its own
transience and finitude.”213 This leaves the final question as to why Nietzsche phrases
this affirmation as an eternal return, which is perhaps answered best by a figure who
stands between Nietzsche and Lacan both historically and philosophically, Martin
Heidegger: “What does the ‘yes’ affirm? Precisely what the ill will of a vengeful spirit
renounced: time, transiency… how can passing away perdure? Only in this way: as
passing away it must not only continuously go, but must also always come. Only in this
way: passing away and transience must recur in their coming as the same.”214 The
thought of the eternal return, taken in this way, is a mythic expression of hope for an
apotheosis of creative affirmation directed towards the past that says to all that is
“fragment,” “riddle,” and “dreadful accident,” “But thus I will it; thus I shall will it.”215
As such, it represents an ideal of health and convalescence, an ideal of overcoming of the
all-too-human spirit of revenge that disparages the ephemeral, denies creative artifice,
and seeks redemption in a religious logic of otherworldly and eternal being. This is
Zarathustra’s greatest wish, and Nietzsche’s central teaching: “For that man be delivered
from revenge, that for me is the bridge to the highest hope, and a rainbow after long
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storms.”216 For Nietzsche, then, the fundamental symptom of life is contempt for
transience itself; the vengeful disparaging of becoming and change is a fault within
subjectivity that can only be stopped through the creative transfiguration of the possible
and the approximation of being through an affirmative artifice of becoming.
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Conclusion
The idea of the sinthome functions as an ideal framework for understanding the mutually
reinforcing insights of Lacan and Nietzsche’s analyses of linguistic subjectivity. The
clarity that the sinthome offers to the project of bringing Nietzsche and Lacan together
stems from its emphasis on art and creativity as the central concerns of Lacan’s thought.
By tracing the origins of this emphasis on artifice in Lacan’s final teachings, it becomes
clear that even his earlier theories are deeply concerned with creatively overcoming the
symptomatic and religious logic of truth. Lacan’s broadest aim, on his own account, is to
exorcise God from language by freeing subjectivity for its creative participation in the
structure of truth itself. With the sinthome, Lacan concludes his teachings with the
articulation of a creative practice of subjectivity that comes to construct itself as a work
of art through a perpetual practice of unknotting and reknotting.
When one approaches Nietzsche with this reading of Lacan in hand the
similarities between their views announce themselves dramatically, as Nietzsche’s
thought is centrally and unambiguously concerned with disclosing the aesthetic character
of reality and cultivating a new creative consciousness capable of overcoming the spectre
of religious metaphysics. The task Nietzsche sets himself as the teacher of the eternal
return and the last disciple of Dionysus is to rewrite the fundamental symptom of
transience as the site of a redemptive transfiguration of existence; he seeks to affirm the
tragic impossibility of permanence through an artifice that knows itself to offer only an
approximation of being, but that nonetheless allows one to escape the gravity of Plato’s
collapsed sun of the Good and make life livable. Nietzsche’s tragic artifice of selfovercoming, insofar as it transfigures the symptom of transience into an affirmative
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engine of new desires and values, is strikingly sinthomatic. Indeed, one could just as
easily invert this formulation and pursue a reading of the sinthome as an inherently tragic
wisdom of creativity, as these two teachings are fundamentally united in their attempt to
replace the corpse of religion with a new art of subjectivity.
This attempt to overcome the spectre of religion raises a final problem that
implicates Nietzsche and Lacan equally. Since God, dead or alive, functions as the
ordering force of reality, a force that is dissimulative, symptomatic, and tyrannical but
functions nonetheless, Nietzsche’s and Lacan’s attempts to exorcise or overcome this
order of truth inevitably raise the question of how a true proliferation of sinthomatic or
Dionysian consciousness would affect collective reality. Lorenzo Chiesa formulates this
concern in the Lacanian context: “how do sinthomes communicate with each other if
there is no common phantasmatic background… Is it not the case that a hypothetical
society of fully sinthomatic beings of language… would inevitably cause a fragmentation
of the Symbolic into many Symbolics, and ultimately its complete demise?”217 The
problem Chiesa identifies, taken more broadly, is whether the therapeutic benefits of such
an artifice of truth, tragic or sinthomatic, ultimately outweigh the threat such an artifice
poses to the preservation of the Symbolic as the effective ground of common reality and
communication. Hence, this question deserves to be addressed from Lacanian and
Nietzschean perspectives alike.
Nietzsche has an obvious but perhaps disheartening response to this problem:
with the dawn of nihilism, the highest values devaluate themselves, particularly in the
sense that the Christian faith in the goodness of truth leads inevitably to the unraveling of
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truth itself. For Nietzsche, then, the problem is that the horizon of universal order has
already been wiped away and cannot be reconstituted as it was; life is tragic. From
another perspective, however, one might say that Nietzsche’s idea of the overman and his
interest in cultivating long-term projects of culture ostensibly suggest the possibility of
something like a new or refashioned Symbolic oriented around a tragic reality principle.
The problem, though, is that such transformations of culture take generations to
accomplish, while the current order of things is one of unlivable nihilism. On this point,
the urgency of cultivating livable forms of subjectivity seems to take precedence over
questions concerning any ideal of collective communication.
On the Lacanian side of this question, the analyst Patricia Gherovici offers a more
concrete example of such urgency through her sinthomatic interpretation of transgender
experience, which she bases on her clinical experience with trans analysands. She writes,
“To cross the frontier between the sexes is often lived as traversing a mortal threshold, a
passage from an impending doom towards a renaissance… it is often a matter of life and
death.”218 If a radically creative artifice of truth is capable of granting livability and
creative agency to genuinely imperiled subjects, trans or otherwise, then it would seem
that the overall effects of such artifice on the maintenance of a dependably common
Symbolic could be, at best, of only secondary importance, if such a Symbolic is indeed
possible at all.219 Gherovici embraces the sinthome as “an invention that allows someone
to live by providing an organization of jouissance,” and suggests that the curative
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function of sinthomatic writing, though it is “more poignantly observed in the chronicles
of people who changed sex,” is applicable to the lives of all.220 While it is obviously true
that some people experience desire as a much more acute crisis than others, such crises
are rooted in the fundamental problems of language and desire as such.
To conclude, by taking Nietzsche and Lacan together one is able to appreciate the
sinthome of tragic wisdom, or the tragic wisdom of the sinthome, “as you like,” as Lacan
might say. By taking the sinthome as the leading theme, as I have, such an encounter
illuminates the creative artifice of desire in Nietzsche’s thought as a writing of the Real
of tragedy that puts a stop to the symptom of God. At the same time, a sinthomatic
reading of Nietzsche enriches one’s understanding of Lacan, as it shines a light back onto
the problem of being at the heart of Lacan’s thought with all of Nietzsche’s force and
urgency. Taken together, the tragic and the sinthome emphasize above all else the
aesthetic character of a life lived in language, and the creativity of desire as the only
artifice capable of imbuing such a life with a livable sense of being.
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